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1
I N T R O D U C T I O N T O T H E D I S S E RTAT I O N
Climate policy usually takes place at the regional level following individual
targets. Although economists urge for collective greenhouse gas emission targets
which protect against free-riding, global climate policy has been marked by
individual targets or a national ‘pledge-and-review’ approach since the mid-
1990s. In the Kyoto Protocol from 1997, countries pledged individual emission
reductions relative to 1990 levels. In the Paris Agreement from 2015, countries
pledged almost anything and the national review processes are still ongoing
(Cramton et al., 2017).
This also applies to Germany who successfully reduced its emissions by
around 22% below 1990 levels by the year 2008, thereby fulfilling its individual
commitment made under the Kyoto Protocol (Umweltbundesamt, 2010). One
of the key drivers behind the successful reduction has been the rapid expan-
sion of renewable energies under the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG)
(Umweltbundesamt, 2010). From its commencement in 2000 to the target year
of the Kyoto pledge 2008, the EEG lead to a successful market penetration of
renewables in the electricity generation mix through the provision of a feed-in
tariff. As a result of the subsidy, renewables began to substitute coal-fired
and gas power stations and thus lead to significant emission reductions in the
energy sector (Klobasa and Sensfuß, 2016). This transition from conventional to
renewable energy sources also leads to changes in the economy. In this regard,
policymakers often promote renewables as an opportunity to reduce emissions
while at the same time fueling economic growth and employment.
Since decision-making on the deployment of renewables often takes place at
the regional level, the potential economic benefits should be evaluated rather
on a regional than on a national scale. The German states (Bundesländer)
usually set up their individual expansion targets, in addition to the federal ones.
Moreover, planning law at the state and municipal level significantly affects
the regional allocation of renewables, especially of wind energy (Strunz et al.,
2016). Finally, renewables depend on the elements of nature, which are scarce
in some regions and plentiful in others.
Against this background, the third chapter of my dissertation analyzes the
regional economic impacts of renewable energies by means of a computable
general equilibrium (CGE) model. In order to do so, we need to regionalize
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a national Input-Output (I-O) table which serves as the main data input for
the model. An I-O table provides detailed information on the economy’s pro-
duction activities, the supply and demand of goods and services, intermediate
consumption, primary inputs and foreign trade for a given year. Therefore,
the accuracy of the regionalization is crucial for model applications. Alas, the
available regionalization techniques in the literature are unsatisfying because
they lack a clear theoretical foundation and are often inconsistent with regard
to the region’s economic accounts. Therefore, the second co-authored chapter of
my dissertation (with Johannes Bröcker), entitled Estimating Trade in a Regional
Input-Output Table, provides a new method which is both theory based and
consistent. I have contributed to this paper at almost every stage of the research
process. While the analytical model and formal derivations stem from my
supervisor, I conducted the empirical analysis and wrote the paper, which is
about to be resubmitted to the Economic Systems Research journal.
The state of Schleswig-Holstein (S-H) in northern Germany is one of the
leading states in expanding renewables, especially wind energy. The local gov-
ernment plans to more than double renewable electricity production by the year
2030 (MELUND, 2016). Therefore, the third chapter of my dissertation, entitled
Regional Economic Impacts of Renewable Energies, contributes the first regional
general equilibrium analysis of the expansion of renewables in Germany (cf.
Jenniches, 2018, Table 8). Existing studies either focus on the national scale
or estimate regional effects by means of supply chain and (or) regional I-O
analysis which both show considerable disadvantages compared to a general
equilibrium approach.1 In this regard, Bröcker et al. (2014, 2016) were the first
to combine the supply chain approach with a regional I-O model as part of a
research project funded by the Gesellschaft für Energie und Klimaschutz Schleswig-
Holstein (EKSH) GmbH. The results of the successful project had a direct impact
on the policy debate. Therefore, this chapter builds upon the work of Bröcker
et al. (2014, 2016), but extends its methodology to a more consistent general
equilibrium framework. I thereby hope to shed further light on the ongoing
policy debate about the economic benefits of renewable energies.
The EEG has led to a successful market penetration of renewables in Germany.
However, it did not lead to a sufficient phase out of high carbon emitting
conventional technologies such as coal-fired power stations in order to meet the
post-Kyoto targets of reducing emissions by 40% below 1990 levels until the year
2020. Most importantly, the EEG collides with the European Union Emissions
1 For national CGE approaches, see e.g. Böhringer et al. (2013, 2017). For supply chain and
regional I-O studies, see the overview by Jenniches (2018), Table 6 and 7.
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Trading System (EU ETS) because while it reduces, ceteris paribus, emissions
in the electricity sector, the excess emission allowances can be sold to other
industry sectors (potentially outside Germany) that are also involved in the EU
ETS. As a result, the EEG’s true effect is merely a shift rather than a reduction
of emissions. Therefore, shortly before the Paris conference in December 2015,
Germany initiated a so-called ‘Climate Action Programme 2020’ which resulted
in a proposal for a climate levy for old coal-fired power stations. Since the
design of the climate levy included the retirement of emission allowances,
it was the first policy option that showed the potential to reconcile EU and
national climate policy in an effective manner.
Therefore, the final co-authored chapter of my dissertation (with Sonja Peter-
son), entitled National Climate Policy under the European Union Emissions Trading
System, explores the potential scope and optimal design of additional regional
climate policy under the EU policy framework. It includes a theoretical and
empirical review of the climate levy as well as two suggestions for an efficient
and effective national carbon price floor design. I thereby hope to contribute
to the ongoing policy debate about effective and economically efficient re-
gional climate policy against the background of overlapping regulation. I have
contributed substantially to this paper at every stage of the research process,
including the design of the research question, empirical modeling as well as
writing and revising the paper. A previous version of this chapter has appeared
as Kiel Working Paper 2052.
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E S T I M AT I N G T R A D E I N A R E G I O N A L I N P U T- O U T P U T
TA B L E
This chapter is under revision and will be resubmitted to the ‘Economic Systems
Research’ journal. It may be referenced as:
Bröcker, Johannes and Johannes Burmeister (2018). Estimating Trade in a
Regional Input-Output Table. Mimeo, University of Kiel.
Abstract: This paper provides a new hands-on recipe for regionalizing national
Input-Output (I-O) tables. While the theoretical grounds of existing non-survey
techniques are shaky, our method is theoretically well-founded, consistent
with accounting constraints and takes reasonable account of cross-hauling. By
formulating a theoretical gravity equation in the functional form of a doubly-
constrained gravity model for two regions, the region under study and the
rest of world, and solving for the region’s internal flow, we derive an internal
trade equation. This trade equation can be readily applied to scale down the
national technical input coefficients in order to estimate the regional input coefficients
for a single region. It depends on the economic size of the region as well as
the region’s ability to buy from and sell to the world market. We extend our
approach to three regions in order to explicitly account for the geographical
size of the region and the distance effect on trade. We call our approach
‘Gravity Regionalization of Trade Approach’ (GRETA). GRETA does not tend
to overestimate regional output multipliers, which is a common critique of
existing techniques and crucial for model applications.
Keywords: Regional input-output tables, non-survey methods, gravity region-
alization of trade, internal trade equation
5
6 estimating trade in a regional input-output table
2.1 introduction
The construction of regional Input-Output (I-O) tables has a long history be-
cause they provide valuable information about regional economic interdepen-
dencies and are the main data input for regional I-O or Computable General
Equilibrium (CGE) models. The modeler can either rely on survey-based ta-
bles provided by statistical offices or construct regional tables with existing
non-survey or semi-survey regionalization methods. Ready-made survey tables
are rare because they are very expensive to produce (Hewings, 1985). Hence,
the usual procedure is regionalizing national I-O tables with a non-survey
technique, which is less accurate but also less expensive. Alas, we find that
existing techniques lack a theoretical foundation, show inconsistencies with
regard to accounting constraints, and do not take reasonable account of cross-
hauling. Therefore, this paper introduces a new non-survey method called
‘Gravity Regionalization of Trade Approach’ (GRETA). It is derived from the
gravity model of trade and thus based on well-established theory. Moreover,
our approach is consistent and takes reasonable account of cross-hauling.
Our point of departure is that the only data at hand is a symmetric, industry-
by-industry I-O table for the nation to which the region under study belongs
to. Further, we assume to have some proxies for the region’s local output and
final use by industry. We then follow a top-down approach and estimate the
regional input coefficients for a single region by adjusting the national technical
input coefficients. The former indicate the inputs supplied from firms within the
region for outputs of firms in that region (R. Miller and Blair, 2009). The latter
indicate the inputs supplied from all firms, either within or outside the nation,
for outputs of firms in the nation. Therefore, the general assumptions are the
same as for the most frequently applied non-survey techniques in the literature,
namely location quotient (LQ) and supply-demand pool (SDP) approaches.
However, these techniques suffer from considerable shortcomings. First of all,
both lack a theoretical foundation. The LQ simply uses output (or employment)
by industry ratios of the region compared to the nation to scale down the
national table. Because of rather poor estimation performance and the preclu-
sion of cross-hauling in the original LQ formula, ad hoc manipulations led to
numerous variants of the technique. However, neither did these provide much
theoretical improvement, nor do they necessarily perform better (Harrigan et al.,
1981; Riddington et al., 2006; Smith and Morrison, 1975). Most importantly,
LQ approaches are not consistent, which has been already pointed out by
Schaffer and Chu (1969). There is no guarantee, for example, that estimates of
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the region’s exports are non-negative. In that case, the formula relies on ad hoc
adjustments.
The SDP approach, originating from work by Isard (1953), estimates the
region’s ‘commodity balance’ (CB) as the difference between regional supply
and demand of a commodity in order to scale down the national table.1 There
is no theoretical motivation for this technique either, but it is at least consistent.
However, as the simplest LQ, the original SDP formula does not allow for
cross-hauling. Therefore, it has been adjusted for cross-hauling by Kronenberg
(2009). But also this technique is not explicitly derived from theory and proves
to be inconsistent without further ad hoc manipulation of its original formula
(cf. Többen and Kronenberg, 2015). Nevertheless, our approach has a point
in common with it, namely the idea that product heterogeneity is behind the
cross-hauling of commodities.
Given these shortcomings and the data requirements of semi-survey ap-
proaches such as the econometric approach by Stevens et al. (1983), we con-
tribute the first non-survey gravity approach for a single region. Gravity ap-
proaches have been initially suggested in an I-O context by Isard and Bramhall
(1960), Leontief and Strout (1963) and Theil (1967). More recent applications
of the gravity approach in I-O studies are Horridge et al. (2005), Lindall et
al. (2006) and Riddington et al. (2006). In contrast to the techniques above,
the gravity approach usually estimates trade flows between regions within
a multi-regional I-O (MRIO) framework. If one has a complete set of within
and between regional trade flows available, the regional input coefficients can
be observed directly. However, this requires a large amount of data such that
existing gravity approaches are rather expensive and do not provide an easy to
use regionalization formula for a single region. Moreover, they do not invoke
the theoretical underpinning of the gravity equation, which we will draw upon
to derive our non-survey method.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section presents
the theoretical foundation of our approach. Based on a gravity model for two
regions, we derive a trade equation that allows us to estimate regional input
coefficients. In Section 2.3, we extend our approach to three regions in order
to explicitly account for the geographical size of the region and the effect of
distance on trade flows. We then discuss and compare our approach with the
existing non-survey alternatives in Section 2.4, followed by an empirical test in
Section 2.5. Finally, we conclude.
1 Therefore, the SDP approach is also referred to as the CB approach.
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2.2 gravity regionalization of trade approach
In this section, we lay the theoretical foundation for our approach. It is based
on the gravity model of trade which is a major workhorse for analyzing the
determinants of bilateral trade flows. The most important characteristic of the
gravity model is that it is consistent with a variety of trade theories. We begin
by presenting the general assumptions of our regionalization approach, which
do not differ from the existing non-survey techniques. We then review the
gravity model of trade and show that the first theoretical gravity equation
by Anderson (1979) can be formulated as what has been called the ‘doubly-
constrained gravity model’ (DCGM) in the transport and urban modeling
traditions (Wilson, 1967, 1971). By solving the theoretical DCGM with only two
regions, the region under study r and the rest of world w, we derive a regional
trade equation that can be readily applied to scale down the national technical
input coefficients. As a result, our approach is rich in theory but inexpensive in
data collection. Finally, we conclude by summarizing the main properties of
the derived trade equation and show that it exhibits desirable properties that
are in line with economic theory.
2.2.1 Regionalization
A typical regionalization technique distributes domestic output and final use
by industry according to proxies such as employment and income shares. This
yields region r’s local output in industry j, xjr, and region r’s local final use, uir,
of commodities from industry i. Furthermore, technical input coefficients aijr in
the region r are assumed to be the same as in the nation n, aijr = a
ij
n . Total local
use for commodities from industry i in region r is thus
yir =∑
j
aijn x
j
r + uir. (2.1)
Hence, the final question is how to estimate region r’s external trade, i.e. exports
eir to and imports mir from the rest of world w, respectively. In this regard, w
comprises the rest of the nation as well as foreign countries. For later use, we
denote the rest of the nation as s and foreign countries as c, i.e. w = {s, c}. The
question reduces to determining the internal trade flow tirr since, by definition,
the difference between local output and internal trade is exports,
eir = x
i
r − tirr, (2.2)
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and the difference between local use and internal trade is imports,
mir = y
i
r − tirr (2.3)
(cf. Wei, 1996, p. 3). In this paper, the term ‘internal’ defines flows with the
identical origin and destination. Hence, internal trade tirr is the amount of
commodities that is bought for intermediate and final use from within the
region.2 Any estimation method for tirr should make sure that tirr is non-negative
and does not exceed either xir or yir. Given estimates of tirr, we are able to obtain
regional input coefficients
aijrr =
tirr
yir
aijn (2.4)
which are the basis for regional I-O models. The term tirr/yir is what R. Miller
and Blair (2009) define as the regional supply proportion ρir, since it is the ‘pro-
portion of the total amount of commodity i available in region r that was
produced in r’. This is exactly what the LQ and SDP approaches estimate. For
simplicity, we make the common assumption that this proportion is uniform
across purchasing industries j (cf. R. Miller and Blair, 2009, p. 348). Further,
by assuming tirr/yir also to be uniform across final customers, we obtain local
internal final use by
uirr =
tirr
yir
uir. (2.5)
2.2.2 The Basic GRETA Model
The gravity model of trade estimates bilateral trade flow values between origins
k and destinations l in industry i, tikl, based on the economic sizes of and
trade costs between trading partners. The following relations are valid for
each industry; so we omit index i up to the next section. The traditional form
inspired by Newton’s equation is
tkl = A
MkNl
dζkl
, (2.6)
2 Intraregional trade would be an alternative and more precise, though very cumbersome
expression.
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where A is a constant and Mk and Nl are the relevant economic activity masses
in the origin and destination, respectively. Depending on whether we work on
the aggregate level or, as here, on the industry level, these masses are aggregate
activities such as GDP or available industry-specific activities such as output.
Trade costs are assumed to correspond roughly with the geographical distance
dkl between trading partners. The parameter to be estimated is the distance
parameter ζ.3 The traditional form stemming from Tinbergen (1962) is not
consistent with economic structure because trade flows are obtained indepen-
dently from one another such that adding up constraints are not satisfied by
(2.6). That is, (2.6) does not guarantee that the sum of flows from origin k to
each destination l equals the origin’s total economic activity Mk. A similar
argument applies to the destination. However, the traditional form has been
widely used as a statistical relationship. In fact, it explains a large fraction of
the variation in observed bilateral trade flows. It has been also widely applied
in the I-O literature to estimate interregional trade flows in MRIO frameworks
(see Leontief and Strout, 1963; Polenske, 1970; Theil, 1967, among others).
So far, the gravity equation is just an intuitive and empirically well performing
relationship. Anderson (1979) offered the first theoretical derivation of a gravity
equation under the assumptions of product differentiation by place of origin, i.e.
based on the Armington (1969) trade model. Armington’s assumption was that
each origin is specialized in the production of a unique commodity for which it
is the only source and that customers would like to buy at least some of each
origin’s commodity. The preferences (or technologies in case of intermediate
consumption) for buying these commodities in each destination are assumed to
be of the CES form and thus completely specified by the CES price index
Pl =
(
∑
k
αk (pkτkl)
1−σ
)1/(1−σ)
. (2.7)
It is the minimum unit expenditure of destination l on composite commodities
from all origins k. The distribution parameter αk is an exogenous measure of
product heterogeneity in origin k. The factory-gate price in origin k is denoted by
pk. Trade costs are assumed to raise the delivered price of a good in destination
l by an ‘iceberg melting’ factor τkl > 1. Then, under perfect competition it
follows that pkl = pkτkl is the price of origin k’s commodity for buyers in l. In
the following, we call τkl the trade barrier. In empirical studies, τkl is usually
approximated not only by the geographical distance as in (2.6) but by further
3 In Newton’s form, ζ = 2.
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observable barriers such as adjacency, trade agreement memberships and so
forth. The elasticity of substitution between commodities from different origins
is denoted by σ. Ordinarily, it is assumed in accordance with the data that
σ > 1. Though, in principle it is possible to allow for σ < 1 in the model (cf.
Armington, 1969, p. 168).
Applying Hotelling’s theorem, Anderson (1979) proceeded to derive the
expenditures on commodities shipped from origin k to destination l as
tkl = αk
(
pkτkl
Pl
)1−σ
yl, (2.8)
where yl is total expenditures in destination l. This is the first theoretical
gravity equation derived from a rather simple trade theory. Different from the
traditional form (2.6), all flows are mutually interdependent due to price effects
and substitution possibilities. Equation (2.8) also covers intuitive relationships.
First, trade flows tkl are proportional to total expenditures yl . That is, the larger
destination l’s economic size, the higher the value of commodities it buys,
including the one from origin k. Secondly, the higher the prices for delivering
varieties from k to l including the costs for shipping the good, pkτkl, the lower
are trade flows. Thirdly, the higher the CES price index Pl, the higher are trade
flows tkl . That is, the relatively more expensive the commodities from all origins
are on average, the more consumers in destination l will substitute them with
commodities from origin k. Lastly, the higher σ, the higher the aforementioned
substitution effect.
The general equilibrium structure of the trade model imposes that markets
for commodities from each origin must clear, i.e. that
xk =∑
l
tkl =∑
l
αk
(
pkτkl
Pl
)1−σ
yl ∀k (2.9)
holds. This is the accounting constraint for each origin k, which guarantees
that the total value of output in origin k, xk, equals the sum of sales to all
destinations l, including sales to k itself. In the I-O context, (2.9) is equivalent
to (2.2), since internal trade are sales of origin k to itself, tkk, and exports are
the sum of sales to all other destinations l except to k itself, ek = ∑l 6=k tkl. The
accounting constraint for each destination l is implicitly given by (2.7)-(2.8) and
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guarantees that total expenditures are equal to the sum of purchases from all
origins k:
yl =∑
k
tkl =∑
k
αk
(
pkτkl
Pl
)1−σ
yl ∀l. (2.10)
In the I-O context, (2.10) is equivalent to (2.3), since internal trade are purchases
of destination l from itself, tll, and imports are the sum of purchases from all
origins k except from l itself, ml = ∑k 6=l tkl.
Therefore, conditional on totals xk and yl, trade flows from (2.8) can be
formulated as a ‘doubly-constrained gravity model’ (DCGM), with
tkl = ak fklbl (2.11)
and constraints
∑
l
tkl = xk, ∑
k
tkl = yl. (2.12)
The balancing factors ak and bl guarantee the fulfillment of the constraints.
The DCGM formulation (2.11)-(2.12) is a specific functional form which is
also known in the I-O literature from Wilson (1971), who integrated different
multiregional I-O models with entropy-maximizing techniques by treating the
interregional I-O equations as constraints for the underlying gravity equation.
Here, balancing factors ak = αk p1−σk and bl = ylP
σ−1
l contain only origin and
destination specific characteristics from the Armington model, respectively. The
factor ak indicates the ‘capabilities’ of origin k as a supplier to all destinations.
The factor bl indicates the ‘potential’ of destination l as a consumer for com-
modities from all origins. Given that σ > 1, fkl = τ1−σkl is a trade cost decay
function. That is, the lower τkl, the higher is fkl and therefore trade flows tkl.
We thus call fkl the trade freeness.
The DCGM formulation (2.11)-(2.12) does not only apply to the Armington
model but to a large set of trade theories as long as the underlying gravity
equation is multiplicatively separable in the ak, bl and fkl terms. For instance,
the Ricardian comparative advantage framework by Eaton and Kortum (2002)
differs from the Armington model in almost every respect and yet can be
formulated as a DCGM. Further examples include a Heckscher-Ohlin frame-
work (Bergstrand, 1985; Deardorff, 1998) and more recent trade theories with
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heterogeneous firms selecting into markets (Chaney, 2008; Helpman et al., 2008;
Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008).4
It is known from Darroch and Ratcliff (1972) that there exist unique flows
tkl solving the bi-proportional system (2.11)-(2.12), if ∑k xk = ∑l yl and, for all
k, l, xk ≥ 0, yl ≥ 0 and fkl > 0. The solution is usually obtained by means of
iterative techniques such as the RAS procedure. However, in the following we
derive an analytical solution for the internal flow trr, i.e. k = r and l = r, for
the two-regions case which can then be readily plugged into (2.4) in order to
estimate regional input coefficients.
2.2.3 Model Solution
Let us consider the DCGM (2.11)-(2.12) for the region under study r and the
rest of world w. The trade flow matrix between r and w then reads
T =
 trr trw
twr tww
 =
 ar frrbr ar frwbw
aw fwrbr aw fwwbw
 . (2.13)
As introduced above, internal trade trr is the amount of commodities that is
bought from within the region and the flow we are looking for. Trade flows
trw and twr are exports to and imports from the rest of world w, respectively.
Recall that w includes the rest of the nation s as well as foreign countries c. The
corresponding accounting constraints according to (2.12) for each origin and
destination are
trr + trw = xr, (2.14)
twr + tww = xw, (2.15)
trr + twr = yr, (2.16)
trw + tww = yw. (2.17)
The bi-proportional system (2.13)-(2.17) can be solved analytically as a function
of the economic size of the region, xr and yr, and a new variable zr = trwtwr/trr.
This leads to a quadratic equation
t2rr − trr (xr + yr + zr) + xryr = 0 (2.18)
4 For a thorough review of the conformity of the gravity model with a variety of trade theories,
we refer to Anderson (2011), Arkolakis et al. (2012) and Head and Mayer (2014).
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with two real solutions. The smaller one applies, yielding a surprisingly simple
formula
trr =
(xr + yr + zr)
2
−
√
(xr + yr + zr)2
4
− xryr. (2.19)
This is shown in Appendix A.1. Equation (2.19) is the internal trade equation,
the key to our non-survey gravity approach. Local output xr and use yr are
approximated as described at the beginning of this section. But where to get zr
from? The variable zr measures the size of the world market, scaled by trade
freeness factors measuring its relevance for the region under study. It can be
written as
zr =
trwtwr
trr
=
araw frw fwrbrbw
ar frrbr
= tww
frw fwr
frr fww
. (2.20)
The variable zr indicates region r’s ability to sell to and buy from the world
market. We thus call zr the relevant world market for region r, shortly written as
zr = twwRr (2.21)
with
Rr =
frw
fww
fwr
frr
=
(
τrw
τww
τwr
τrr
)1−σ
. (2.22)
The size of the world market is measured by the internal trade value within the
rest of world, tww, and its relevance for region r by the factor Rr. In the trade
literature,
√
Rr is known as an average measure of bilateral trade integration
(cf. Head and Ries, 2001, p. 863; Chen and Novy, 2011, p. 208). This factor is
decreasing in the relative trade barriers to flows between the region and the
rest of world. According to (2.22), what matters for the relevance of sales to the
rest of world are not trade barriers τrw themselves but relative trade barriers
τrw/τww to procurements within the rest of world. Similarly, what matters for
the relevance of purchases from the rest of world are not trade barriers τwr
themselves but relative trade barriers τwr/τrr to procurements within the region
under study. Output xr, use yr and internal trade tww are all measured in values
of the corresponding I-O table (e.g. million dollars). The factor Rr only consists
of trade cost mark-up factors and is thus dimensionless. Hence, zr is measured
in values as well. This is as it should be, otherwise one could not add up
xr, yr and zr in the internal trade equation (2.19). One might be worried about
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measuring the size of the world market by tww, which is itself an endogenous
variable in the DCGM (2.13)-(2.17), rather than by xw or yw. This is a valid
objection as long as the rest of world is not large compared to the region under
study. If the rest of world is large, then zr = twwRr and z˜r = xwRr tend to
produce identical results, which we show in Appendix A.2.
We still lack an estimate of zr. Though our approach is quite different from
the widely used ‘cross-hauling adjusted regionalization method’ (CHARM) by
Kronenberg (2009), we have a point in common with it, namely the idea that
product heterogeneity is behind the cross-hauling of commodities. In our case,
the relevant world market is an indirect measure of cross-hauling. As we will
show in the next section, if there is no relevant world market for the region, there
is no cross-hauling of commodities but only internal trade. In contrast, if the
relevant world market for the region is infinitely large, there is only cross-hauling
of commodities but no internal trade. Similar to CHARM, we find that cross-
hauling at the national level is the best source we have for quantifying it as long
as no further geographical information is incorporated (see Section 2.3 below).
Thus, the most inexpensive way is to assume that the relevant world market for
the region and nation coincides, i.e. zr = zn. This implies that the average trade
integration with the rest of world of the region and nation coincides, which is
a rather strict assumption that we will discuss at the end of this section. The
national value can be obtained by solving (2.18) for zn, i.e. with r = n. This
leads to
zr = zn = tn − (xn + yn) + xnyntn . (2.23)
All values on the right hand side of (2.23) are easily obtained from the national
I-O table.5 Finally, plugging values zr into (2.19) leads to internal trade trr and
thereby estimates of regional input coefficients.
Let us summarize GRETA’s two-regions recipe for industry i:
1) Estimate xir and uir with employment and income shares of the region and
national I-O data.
2) Calculate yir = ∑j a
ij
n x
j
r + uir.
3) Calculate zir = zin = tin − (xin + yin) + xinyin/tin with national I-O data.
4) Plug xir, yir and zir into (2.19) to obtain tirr.
5) Finally, calculate aijrr = ρira
ij
n with ρir = tirr/yir.
5 Recall that tn = xn − en = yn −mn.
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2.2.4 Properties
The main ingredient of the above recipe is the internal trade equation. In the
following, we show how it depends on its determinants, i.e. the region’s eco-
nomic sizes and its relevant world market. We find that (2.19) is consistent with
accounting constraints, cross-hauling, and economic theory in general. Relations
are valid for each region-industry pair; so we omit also index r up to the next
section.
First of all, our approach fulfills the accounting constraint that internal trade
is non-negative and cannot exceed the minimum of the region’s local output
and use,
0 ≤ t(x, y, z) ≤ min (x, y). (2.24)
This is a minimal consistency requirement any regionalization approach should
fulfill. However, this is not the case for all existing LQ techniques as well as the
original CHARM, which we will show in the discussion. The proof of (2.24) is
given in (2.45) and (2.46) of Appendix A.1.
Next, we show how t responds to its determinants x, y and z. Internal trade t
is increasing in local output x and use y,
∂t(x, y, z)
∂x
=
m
m + e + z
≥ 0 (2.25)
and
∂t(x, y, z)
∂y
=
e
m + e + z
≥ 0. (2.26)
In other words, the larger the economic size of the region is, the higher are
internal trade flows. This is an intuitive relationship that we already pointed
out regarding the trade flows of the underlying gravity model. The proof is
given in Appendix A.3.
The most important feature of our approach is that a simultaneous increase
in local output and use causes a more than proportional increase of internal
trade, i.e. if λ > 1, then
t (λx,λy, z) > λt (x, y, z) . (2.27)
We show this in Appendix A.4. Say, local output and use in the region double,
then internal trade t more than doubles. This is a desirable property which is
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directly related to the occurrence of cross-hauling and product heterogeneity.
Imagine a region that only produces one variety within an industry of the I-O
table such that its economic size is small. Due to product differentiation, cross-
hauling in this industry is expected to be high since the producer sells to the
large rest of world market and customers only have one variety to buy. In other
words, the regional supply proportion is expected to be low. Now, imagine the
region’s economic size increases. The more it covers the size of the world market,
the more varieties it will be able to produce and supply to itself. Thus, less
cross-hauling occurs and the regional supply proportion is supposed to increase.
In the extreme case, the region itself is the world market producing all of the
varieties within the industry. Then, everything will be traded internally and no
cross-hauling takes place. If, in contrast, internal trade increases proportionally
to local output and use, the regional supply proportion remains constant regardless
of the economic size of the region. This is implausible, but indeed the property
of e.g. the widely used CHARM as discussed below.
Moreover, internal trade t is decreasing in the relevant world market z,
∂t(x, y, z)
∂z
= − t
m + e + z
≤ 0. (2.28)
Though not obvious from (2.19), this is suggestive, given that the relevant world
market is increasing in the internal trade barrier τrr. If the relevant world market
for the region increases, local firms trade more with firms from the rest of world
than with other local firms.
In particular, if on the one hand the relevant world market is zero, internal
trade equals the minimum of local output and use,
t(x, y, 0) = min (x, y). (2.29)
Without any relevant world market to trade with, the region trades the maximum
possible amount internally. If t = x ≤ y, internal trade increases proportionally
to output and is independent of use. If t = y ≤ x, internal trade increases
proportionally to use and is independent of output. In this extreme case, our
method reduces to the original SDP approach which precludes cross-hauling.
On the other hand, if the relevant world market becomes infinitely large,
internal trade approaches zero,
lim
z→∞ t(x, y, z) = 0. (2.30)
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In this case, all output x is exported and all use y is imported. Both limiting
cases are proven in A.5 of the appendix. All of the above inequalities also hold
strictly for x, y, z > 0.
To sum up, the internal trade equation is consistent, takes reasonable account
of cross-hauling and exhibits desirable properties that are in line with economic
theory. However, the low data requirements of our approach come at the cost of
geographical inaccuracy. By assuming that the relevant world market of the region
and nation coincides, we assume that the size of the world market as well as
the average trade integration coincide. As long as the region’s economy is small,
the former is a valid assumption. However, the average trade integration of
the region and nation are likely to differ. In particular, we assume that both
face the same external trade barriers, i.e. τrw = τnc and τwr = τcn, as well as
internal barrier within themselves, i.e. τrr = τnn. Regarding external barriers,
from the regional perspective w includes the rest of the nation as well as other
countries. Trade barriers with other municipalities, counties or federal states,
however, are likely to differ from trade barriers with other countries, which may
involve tariffs, different currencies and so forth. Regarding internal barriers,
the main impedance is geographical distance for shipping commodities from
one local firm to another, because barriers such as border tariffs usually do no
exist within a nation. Hence, if the geographical size of the region significantly
differs from the nation’s, internal barriers are likely to differ. That is, distance
matters, which we will take into account by extending our approach to three
regions.
2.3 distance in gravity regionalization of trade approach
Let us consider the CES gravity model from the previous section for three
regions: the region under study r, the rest of the nation s and foreign countries
c. There are thus nine flows to be determined, but we need to consider only
those eight flows that affect the nation to which the region under study belongs
to. The trade matrix to be set up then reads
T =

trr trs trc
tsr tss tsc
tcr tcs −
 , (2.31)
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where internal trade flows within the rest of world are not of interest. Again,
we are looking for the internal trade flow trr in order to estimate regional input
coefficients for a single region. The corresponding accounting constraints are row
totals xr, xs and mn, and column totals yr, ys and en, where mn and en denote
national imports and exports, respectively. We again assume trade flows as in
(2.8) such that there might potentially be eight different trade barriers, but for
the sake of data parsimony we reduce them to three different barriers, namely
τ1 = τrr, (2.32)
τ2 = τrs = τsr = τss, (2.33)
τ3 = τrc = τsc = τcr = τcs. (2.34)
Barrier τ2 implies symmetric trade barriers within the nation, which is a com-
mon assumption in the gravity trade literature. It means that trade costs for
shipping cars from the region to the rest of the nation coincide with costs for
shipping cars from the rest of the nation to the region. More importantly, we
assume that the barrier between region r and rest of the nation s coincides with
the barrier within the rest of the nation s. Finally, besides symmetry, we assume
that the trade barrier between region r and foreign countries c coincides with
the barrier between the rest of the nation s and foreign countries c.
Given trade flows of the form
tkl = αk
(
pkτkl
Pl
)1−σ
yl
and trade barriers (2.32)-(2.34), we may rewrite trade matrix (2.31) as
T =

arγbr arbs arbc
asbr asbs asbc
acbr acbs −
 , (2.35)
with γ = (τ1/τ2)
1−σ,
ar = αr (prτ2)
1−σ ,
as = αs (psτ2)
1−σ ,
ac = αc (pcτ3)
1−σ ,
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and
br = yr/P1−σr ,
bs = ys/P1−σs ,
bc =
(
τ3
τ2Pc
)1−σ
yc.
The factor γ is the internal barrier of the region relative to the internal barrier
of the rest of the nation. In the following, we call it the relative geographical
barrier. Given that σ > 1, the higher τss relative to τrr, the higher γ and thus
internal trade trr. In other words, if it is relatively cheaper to trade with local
firms rather than with firms in the rest of the nation, the higher is trade with
the former.
In order to obtain trr, the bi-proportional system in (2.35) can be solved by
iterative proportional fitting i.e. the RAS procedure with the mentioned row
and column totals from above and balancing factors ar, as, ac and br, bs, bc. The
solution is positive and unique, if the data is strongly consistent, meaning if
there exists a matrix with the lower right entry equal to zero and all other
entries strictly positive, such that the row and column constraints are fulfilled.
For this to be the case, the row and column totals must obviously be positive,
and the row totals and column totals must sum up to the same amount, i.e.
national output plus imports must equal national use plus exports, xr + xs +
mn = yr + ys + en. This is necessary, but not sufficient. For sufficiency it must
also hold that domestic output exceeds exports, xr + xs > en (or equivalently
yr + ys > mn). The case xr + xs = en (or equivalently yr + ys = mn) is also
allowed. It is called ‘just consistent’. The solution is in this case trivial: it implies
all domestic flows, including trr, to vanish.
Thus, we only lack an initial value for the relative geographical barrier
γ =
(
τrr
τss
)1−σ
(2.36)
that we can plug into the RAS procedure. In empirical gravity studies, trade
barriers are approximated by various bilateral geographical and trade policy
variables. Regarding the internal barrier, the main impedance is geographical
distance. We assume the general form τkk = d
ζ
kk for k = r or s, with distance
parameter ζ and average internal distance dkk. This is a commonly assumed
though not the only possible functional form. Alternative representations in-
clude the exponential or a step function, among many others. For a thorough
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discussion of trade costs we refer to Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). The
internal distance is the average distance a local firm faces when shipping
commodities to another local firm within the region. A useful but obviously ex-
pensive measure would be a weighted average of the distance between all cities
in the region under study. Less expensive measures for the internal distance
are one-quarter of the distance to the nearest foreign center as in Wei (1996),
the distance between the two largest cities as in Wolf (2000), or the square root
of the region’s area multiplied by a proportionality factor as in Leamer (1997),
Nitsch (2000) and Head and Mayer (2000). Here, we assume the general form
dkk = F
φ
k , with parameter φ and area size Fk. Inserting the general form above
into (2.36) leads to
γ =
(
Fφζr
Fφζs
)1−σ
. (2.37)
Finally, by taking the natural log of (2.37), the relative geographical barrier can be
reformulated to
lnγ = η (ln Fs − ln Fr) , (2.38)
with η = φζ (σ− 1). Area sizes of the region and rest of the nation are easily
available. Thus, we only need an estimate of η, which is the elasticity of trade
with respect to distance of a standard gravity estimation at commodity level
where φ = 1. It can, for example, be obtained from Leamer (1974), Möhlmann
et al. (2009) and Anderson and Yotov (2010a,b). For the sake of user friendli-
ness, we also provide ηˆ’s for 18 commodities in the first column of Table 2.2,
Section 2.5 based on the estimation by Meier (2018). Further, we provide the
RAS procedure for solving system (2.35) in the supplementary material to this
paper.
Let us summarize GRETA’s three-regions recipe for industry i:
i) Step 1)-2) from the previous section.
ii) Calculate xis = xin − xir and yis = yin − yir.
iii) Obtain Fr, Fs, and distance parameter ηi from the literature or Table 2.2 in
order to calculate γi by (2.38).
iv) Plug xir, xis, min, yir, yis, ein and γi into the RAS program in order to obtain
tirr.
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v) Finally, calculate aijrr = ρira
ij
n with ρir = tirr/yir.
This recipe is almost as easy to use as the internal trade equation, though a
little more expensive. Its main ingredient is the relative geographical barrier
which depends on estimates of the distance parameter. The literature on such
estimates is rich but diverse. In general, there is strong empirical evidence
for the negative impact of distance on trade and that it is persistent since the
middle of the last century (Disdier and Head, 2008). The magnitude, however,
depends on various factors such as the underlying functional form, the distance
measurement technique, the regression method and the level of commodity
aggregation, among others. Moreover, there is little or no empirical evidence for
the distance effect on trade in services due to the lack of data (Larch et al., 2017).
If in fact there is no distance barrier for trade in services, we may simply use our
two-regions approach from the previous section for regionalizing the service
industries of the I-O table, which we will explore further in the empirical test
of our approach.
2.4 discussion
The I-O regionalization approach developed in the course of this paper shows
considerable advantages compared to existing techniques, which are summa-
rized in Table 2.1 below. First of all, given the low data requirements, we
consider both our approaches to be pure non-survey methods which can other-
wise only be said about LQ and SDP techniques.
In contrast, the econometric approach by Stevens et al. (1983) as well as the
gravity approaches by Lindall et al. (2006) and Riddington et al. (2006) can be
considered as semi-survey approaches. Stevens et al. (1983) estimate what are
essentially the regional supply proportions ρir, which the authors termed regional
purchase coefficients (RPCs). The RPCs are assumed to depend on the LQ, but
also on further ratios of regional to national values such as relative wages and
land area. The relationships of the RPCs and these ratios have been fitted by
different regression techniques to a unique set of transportation data of the
US census and thus require a large amount of data (Stevens et al., 1988; Treyz
and Stevens, 1985). This is why the approach has never found widespread
application, although it is both a theoretical and empirical improvement to LQ
and SDP approaches (Kronenberg, 2007; Stevens et al., 1988). Besides, the RPC
approach does not guarantee consistent estimation results regarding accounting
constraints which is a further disadvantage of the technique. Lindall et al.
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(2006) provide an alternative approach to obtain RPCs by estimating trade
flows between thousands of US counties with a DCGM. Similarly, Riddington
et al. (2006) estimate trade flows between 40 Scottish regions by a DCGM and
find that their approach produces more reasonable output and expenditure
multipliers for a single region than LQ approaches. However, also these studies
require a large amount of data and do not provide an easy to use regionalization
recipe for a single region.
Hence, our main competitors are LQ and SDP techniques. The LQ is the
most prominent and frequently used regionalization technique in applied
analysis. For instance, the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the US Department
of Commerce sells regional multipliers produced by their ‘Regional Impact
Modeling System (RIMS II)’ which uses LQs to estimate regional input coefficients.
Despite its frequent application, the technique shows considerable theoretical
and empirical deficiencies which the I-O literature is well aware of. First of
all, LQs do not guarantee consistent results. On a national scale, we have by
definition
ein = x
i
n − tinn = xin −∑
j
aijnnx
j
n − uin. (2.39)
If we scale (2.39) down to a region that has a significantly different production
structure than the nation, it is not guaranteed that exports eir are non-negative,
i.e. that tirr is smaller or equal to local output xir. A similar argument holds
for imports. In that case, LQ techniques require ad-hoc balancing corrections
which has been already criticized by Schaffer and Chu (1969). We showed
in (2.24) that this cannot happen with our approach. Further, the simple LQ
assumes product homogeneity and thus precludes the possibility of cross-
hauling a priori. Tackling this theoretical as well as other empirical issues led
to numerous variants of the simple LQ such as the Cross-Industry LQ and
its commonly used modification, the FLQ by Flegg and Webber (1997). These
do not preclude cross-hauling, but neither do they add much theory to the
mechanics of the technique, nor necessarily perform better (Harrigan et al., 1981;
Riddington et al., 2006; Smith and Morrison, 1975). A case for LQ techniques
that has been made in the literature (Flegg and Tohmo, 2013; Kronenberg,
2012) is its applicability if only national input coefficients aijnn rather than national
technical input coefficients aijn are known. However, we find that national I-O
tables that only include information about the former are rare. Usually, tables
that are based on the System of National Accounts (SNA) like the ones provided
by Eurostat or the World Input-Output Database (Dietzenbacher et al., 2013)
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include information about both. Nevertheless, in the unlikely event that the
modeler has a table containing only information about aijnn’s, and given the
disadvantages of the LQ approach, we rather recommend to construct the aijn ’s
by expanding the I-O table with a column of foreign imports by industry and
applying the RAS method.6
The SDP technique, although being very similar to the LQ as shown by
Robison and J. Miller (1988), is less present in applied regional analysis. The
main advantage compared to the LQ is that it is at least consistent or ‘self-
balancing’ (Schaffer and Chu, 1969). However, as the simplest LQ, it also
precludes cross-hauling. Therefore, Kronenberg (2009) adjusts the original
technique by a measure of product heterogeneity as the main reason for the
cross-hauling of commodities. To discuss it more deeply, we again omit industry
index i. This ‘cross-hauling adjusted regionalization method’ (CHARM) can, in
an intuitive way, be rewritten as a an internal trade equation like (2.19) as
trr = min (xr, yr)− hr xr + yr2 , (2.40)
which we show in Appendix A.6. It says that trr equals the maximum internal
flow min (xr, yr), downward corrected by the cross-hauling share hr ∈ [0, 1] of
the mean between xr and yr. This share is assumed to be a measure of product
heterogeneity. One obtains the nation’s cross-hauling share hn by solving (2.40)
for hn with national data, i.e. with r = n,
hn =
(
min (xn, yn)− tn
) 2
xn + yn
.
Assuming that product heterogeneity is independent of location, it is supposed
to be the same in the region and the nation so that hr = hn. Inserting this for hr
into (2.40) yields the estimates for trr which can then be plugged into (2.4) in
order to estimate regional input coefficients.
Alas, (2.40) is inconsistent. Obviously, trr ≤ min (xr, yr), as it should, with
equality in case of tn = min (xn, yn). But unfortunately, trr might well become
negative. As an extreme example, let tn = 0, xn = yn, yr > 0 and xr = 0, then
trr = −yr/2 < 0. This shortcoming of the initial approach is corrected ad-hoc
while presenting a multi-regional approach in Többen and Kronenberg (2015).7
The mean in (2.40) is replaced by the minimum which makes the technique
consistent again. In addition, the corrected version of CHARM follows a three-
6 Data on foreign imports by industry is usually available at country level in the national external
trade statistics.
7 Without explicitly correcting Kronenberg (2009).
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regions approach (region r, rest of the country s and rest of world w). In general,
CHARM is an improvement compared to the existing LQ and SDP techniques
because it includes a measure of product heterogeneity. It is, however, not
explicitly derived from theory which is the main reason for its consistency issue
in the first place.
Moreover, (2.40) is proportionally increasing in the region’s local output and
use, i.e. if λ > 1, t(λx,λy, h) = λt(x, y, h). That is, if output and use in the
region under study double, internal trade also doubles. In other words, a simple
scaling up of the regional economy has no effect on its regional supply proportions
(cf. Kronenberg, 2009, requirement 2 on page 50). However, we argued that if
the region’s economic size increases, it should be able to produce and supply
relatively more varieties to itself. Thus, if taking product heterogeneity seriously,
we do not find this a desirable property of the CHARM formula.
To sum up, all the existing regionalization methods show disadvantages
compared to our approach. All of them lack a clear theoretical foundation. The
existing gravity approaches (DREAM and Lindall et al. (2006)) are expensive
and focus on the multi-regional level. The LQ techniques are not consistent.
The original SDP technique is consistent but precludes cross-hauling. Finally,
CHARM does not take reasonable account of cross-hauling by assuming that it
is proportional to the economic size of the region.
Given these disadvantages, we also expect to outperform the existing tech-
niques empirically. However, also our approaches rely on strong assumptions.
Our two-regions approach assumes that the relevant world market of the region
and nation coincides. Therefore, we expect the estimates of our two-regions
approach to be upward biased in the way that it overestimates internal and un-
derestimates external trade. This is because we assume national external trade
barriers that are likely to be too high in order to apply them to the regional level.
This has been taken care of by our three-regions approach whose estimates,
however, depend on the accuracy of the distance parameters which the modeler
is free to choose from the literature. Therefore, we provide a sensitivity analysis
with respect to the distance elasticity of trade within the next section. It remains
to take our approach to the data and test its performance.
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Table 2.1: Comparison of different I-O regionalization methods
Method Non-
survey
Single-
region
Theory
based
Consistent Cross-
hauling
Geographical
size
LQ × ×
CILQ × × ×
FLQ × × ×
SDP × × ×
CHARM1 × × ×
CHARM2 × × × ×
RPC × ×
DREAM × × ×
Lindall et al.
(2006)
× × ×
GRETA1 × × × × ×
GRETA2 × × × × × ×
Note: LQ, Location Quotient; CILQ, Cross-Industry Location Quotient; FLQ, Flegg’s Location Quotient by Flegg and
Webber (1997); SDP, Supply Demand Pool; CHARM1, Cross-Hauling Adjusted Regionalization Method by Kronen-
berg (2009); CHARM2, Corrected CHARM1 formula from Többen and Kronenberg (2015); RPC, Regional Purchase
Coefficients by Stevens et al. (1983); DREAM, Detailed Regional Economic Accounting Model by Riddington et al.
(2006); GRETA1, Two-regions Gravity Regionalization of Trade Approach; GRETA2, Three-regions Gravity Regional-
ization of Trade Approach.
2.5 empirical test
In the following, we present a first empirical test for estimating internal trade
with our approach. It is based on comprehensive Japanese multi-regional I-O
survey data for the year 2005 provided by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry (METI), Japan.8 Japan has a long history in constructing regional I-O
tables. Since 1960, every five years the METI has carried out a joint project with
various prefectural Bureaus of Economy, Trade and Industry, among others,
in order to construct regional I-O tables. The tables were constructed, inter
alia, with comprehensive survey information. In the manufacturing industries,
trade estimates are based on commodity distribution and regional movement of
freight surveys. In the service industries, these estimates rely on interregional
traveler fares, passengers carried tables, and headquarters office expenses.
The latest table for the year 2005 includes nine Japanese regions depicted in
Figure 2.1 and 53 industries. For ease of comparison, we aggregate the table
8 For a full description of the data and construction methodology, we refer to the ‘debrief report’
(Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 2010).
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to 18 industries according to the classification of the gravity estimation from
Table 2.2.
Figure 2.1: The nine regions of the multi-regional I-O table of Japan in 2005
Source: www.japan-guide.com
Based on the survey table, we calculate for each region and industry the
benchmark internal trade value as the difference between local output and
exports, i.e. tirr = xir − eis − eic, and compare them with estimates tˆirr of our
approach as well as CHARM. Given the theoretical and empirical issues of the
LQ, we refrain from applying the technique here. It is important to note that
we do not estimate local output xir and use yir. Instead, we use the survey data
because the main objective is to evaluate the performance of estimating the
regional trade pattern.
The summary statistics are shown in Table 2.3, Appendix A.7. The square root
of the weighted mean squared error (Root wMSE) shows the average deviation
from the survey data in billion Yen. We weight the MSE by each industry’s
share in the region’s total local output. GRETA1, our two-regions approach,
outperforms CHARM1 in all regions except Okinawa. However, the comparison
is biased because CHARM1 produces inconsistent estimates (tˆirr < 0) for the
‘Pharmaceuticals’ and ‘Computer’ industries in Okinawa.9 Compared to the
corrected version which we denote CHARM2, GRETA1 outperforms CHARM2
9 In fact, if we estimate internal trade for the original 53 industries, CHARM1 does not only
produce inconsistent estimates in Okinawa but in all other regions as well.
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in six out of nine regions. According to the summary statistics, our three-regions
approach, GRETA2, performs worse than the other approaches. However, this is
only due to the fact that our three-regions approach is not suitable to estimate
trade in service industries which we will discuss in the following.
In general, GRETA1 and both versions of CHARM significantly overestimate
internal trade in manufacturing industries (industries 1-13), but perform rather
well in service industries (industries 14-18). In contrast, GRETA2 performs fairly
well in manufacturing industries, but significantly underestimates internal trade
in service industries. This is depicted in the more detailed sectoral results for
each region in Figure 2.2-2.10 of Appendix A.8 in which the bars show the
natural logarithm of deviations from the survey data, ln(tˆirr/tirr). Except for the
regions Hokkaido and Okinawa (Figure 2.2 and 2.10), our two-regions approach
systematically overestimates internal trade in manufacturing industries because
of the assumption that the relevant world market of the region and nation coin-
cides. In the survey data, we observe that regions trade heavily with the rest
of the nation which our two-regions approach does not take reasonably into
account due to the geographical inaccuracy of the above assumption. That is,
trade barriers between Japanese regions are in fact lower compared to barriers
between Japan and the rest of the world. Regarding the service industries,
the Japanese regions are highly self sufficient i.e. regional supply proportions
are observed to be high. The average regional proportions range from 0.75 in
Chubu to 0.93 in Kanto. The national average is 0.99. For GRETA1, the latter
implies that the nation’s relevant world market zin for service industries is close
to zero. Therefore, GRETA1, which assumes zir = zin, results in internal trade
estimates that are very close to the survey data. That is, with no relevant world
market to trade with, most of the regions trade the maximum possible amount
internally (recall (2.29)). Similar arguments hold for product heterogeneity in
CHARM, i.e. hir = hin.
In contrast, our three-regions approach accounts for the geographical sizes of
the regions as well as the effect of distance on trade flow values. However, it
depends on the availability and accuracy of the distance parameter estimates ηˆ,
which we provide in the first column of Table 2.2 below. The estimates are based
on a gravity estimation with international trade data and indicate the elasticity
of trade with respect to distance.10 For instance, a 1% increase in the average
distance between trading partners leads to a 1.6% decrease in the average trade
value of agricultural products. The larger the parameter is in absolute terms, the
less the region trades with the rest of the nation and thus the higher are internal
10 A brief description of the gravity estimation is provided in Appendix A.9.
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trade values estimated by GRETA2. Regarding the manufacturing industries,
the approach shows no systemic bias and performs fairly well in estimating
internal trade, especially in economically more important regions such as Kanto
(in which Tokyo is located), Chubu, and Kinki (Figure 2.4-2.6). All are located
on the main island of Japan and constitute more than two thirds of Japan’s total
domestic output. This is also indicated by the last columns of Table 2.2 which
show the distance parameters inferred from the survey data for four selected
regions. We find that the parameters inferred from international trade data are
fairly suitable for applying GRETA2 to the manufacturing sectors of the above
regions, whereas less suitable for more self sufficient regions such as Hokkaido
where the distance effect is expected to be larger.
Regarding the service industries, we find strong indication that the survey
data, in which regions trade heavily with the nearby rest of Japan, show a
larger distance effect as what can be inferred from international trade data.
This is plausible because anyway under long distances those commodities self
select into long distance trade if they are more easily tradable. This means
that commodities with higher obstacles to trade self select into short distance
trade which suggests that for short distances the distance parameter should
be larger in absolute terms. Therefore, we find that especially for the service
industries the distance parameter should be much larger than the ones inferred
from international trade data. In fact, if we would let the parameter go to
infinity, we expect GRETA2 to yield similar results as GRETA1 with a relevant
world market close to zero for the service industries. Therefore, we suggest the
modeler to apply GRETA2 to manufacturing industries and GRETA1 to the
service industries of the underlying I-O table.
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Table 2.2: Poisson Quasi-Maximum Likelihood estimation results for the elasticity of
trade with respect to distance η
Industries −ηˆ Std.
Err.
p-
value
−η∗ −η∗ −η∗ −η∗
Hokkaido Kanto Chubu Kinki
Manufacturing
1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing -1.60** 0.54 0.003 -3.36 -1.27 -2.61 -1.64
2 Mining and quarrying -2.28*** 0.33 0.000 -2.77 -1.01 -1.87 -1.04
3 Food, beverages, tobacco -1.26*** 0.35 0.000 -2.69 -0.94 -2.01 -0.96
4 Textiles, clothing, leather -1.17** 0.43 0.007 -2.91 -0.71 -0.87 -0.27
5 Wood, Paper, Printing -0.91* 0.38 0.017 -3.30 -0.46 -1.89 -1.10
6 Coke, refined petroleum -2.93** 0.90 0.001 -2.72 -1.11 -2.16 -1.41
7 Chemicals -1.35*** 0.29 0.000 -3.63 -0.58 -1.13 -0.61
8 Pharmaceuticals -0.69 0.58 0.236 -0.71 -0.19 -0.73 -0.12
9 Rubber, Plastic -1.35** 0.45 0.003 -4.83 -0.81 -1.59 -0.65
10 Metals -1.25*** 0.33 0.000 -4.20 -1.03 -1.59 -1.05
11 Computer -1.00*** 0.20 0.000 -2.17 -0.13 -0.88 -0.37
12 Machinery -0.88** 0.28 0.002 -2.85 -0.36 -0.91 -0.45
13 Motor Vehicles -0.44 0.28 0.123 -2.23 -0.70 -1.15 -0.75
Services
14 Electricity, gas, water, waste -1.72 1.10 0.120 -10.14 -3.28 -6.12 -3.74
15 Accomodation -0.90 2.93 0.758 -4.36 -1.28 -2.00 -1.41
16 IT and communications -1.29 1.49 0.385 -5.43 -1.52 -3.64 -2.20
17 Real estate -1.11 0.59 0.061 -7.94 -4.01 -7.30 -4.94
18 Business services -0.69 3.49 0.843 -6.14 -2.03 -4.18 -2.47
Note: The estimates ηˆ are provided by Meier (2018).
Regarding output multipliers, GRETA1, CHARM1 and CHARM2 rather over-
estimate whereas GRETA2 underestimates multipliers (see Table 2.3, Appendix
A.7). The latter result is biased because it includes the service industries for
which our three-regions approach is not suitable as explained above. However,
we find that even if we exclude the service industries, GRETA2 still rather un-
derestimates multipliers. The systematic overestimation of regional multipliers
has been a common critique in the non-survey I-O literature (cf. Jackson, 1998;
Richardson, 1985; Robison and J. Miller, 1988; Többen and Kronenberg, 2015).
The reason is that it leads to model results which inflate regional economic
impact assessments. We may thus conclude that GRETA2 is the first non-survey
approach which does not systematically overestimate multipliers but rather
provides more conservative estimates.
To sum up, the first empirical test of our approach is promising. It is, of course,
far from being conclusive because survey-based models are not necessarily
the best standards for comparison in the first place because they may partly
rely on non- or semi-survey techniques themselves. However, the test provides
some interesting insights into our approach. In particular, GRETA2 tackles the
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ongoing critique of overestimating internal trade and output multipliers. While
estimation results of GRETA1 seem the most accurate at first glance, the detailed
results on the industry level show the systemic overestimation of internal trade
in manufacturing sectors. Therefore, accounting for the geographical size of the
region and the distance effect on trade is important and leads to more accurate
estimates of internal trade in manufacturing sectors. Most importantly, the
estimates do not seem to be systematically biased. Finally, since distance matters
less for trade of services compared to manufactured goods, we recommend the
modeler to apply GRETA1 to service industries and GRETA2 to manufacturing
industries of the underlying I-O table.
2.6 conclusion
In this paper, we provided a new hands-on recipe for regionalizing national I-O
tables. Our non-survey ‘Gravity Regionalization of Trade Approach’ (GRETA)
does not differ from other regionalization techniques in estimating local output
and use, but it differs in estimating regional trade. Most importantly, our
approach is theory based. By formulating a theoretical gravity equation in the
functional form of a doubly-constrained gravity model for two regions, the
region under study and the rest of world, and solving for the region’s internal
flow, we derive a closed form internal trade equation. This trade equation can
be readily applied to scale down the national technical input coefficients in order
to estimate the regional input coefficients for a single region. It depends on the
region’s economic size as well as its ability to buy from and sell to the world
market, or in short, the region’s relevant world market. We further showed that, as
long as the underlying theoretical gravity equation is multiplicatively separable,
it is consistent with our internal trade equation. This requirement applies to a
large set of modern trade theories which makes our approach theoretically very
attractive.
We showed that our trade equation exhibits desirable properties. Internal
trade is non-negative and increasing in both, output and use, without exceeding
either. As shown, other non-survey techniques violate this consistency require-
ment by allowing for both, negative internal trade as well as internal trade
exceeding output or use. Internal trade is furthermore decreasing in the relevant
world market, with the two sensible limits of no internal trade for an infinite
relevant world market and internal trade equal to the smaller one of either output
or use for a vanishing relevant world market. Finally internal trade exhibits a
desirable scaling property: scaling output and use up leads to a more than
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proportional increase of internal trade, reflecting the fact that scaling does not
only affect output and use per commodity, but also product heterogeneity.
Since distance matters for estimating trade flows, we have also extended our
gravity approach to three regions in order to explicitly account for the region’s
geographical size and the distance effect on trade. By doing so, the solution for
the internal trade flow cannot be easily derived in closed form any more, but
can be found by e.g. the RAS procedure. In our three-regions approach, internal
trade depends on the region’s economic size as well as its internal trade barrier
relative to the internal trade barrier within the rest of the nation. The latter,
which we call the region’s relative geographical barrier, can be approximated by
the region’s and nation’s land area and the distance parameters of a standard
gravity estimation at commodity level.
We showed that existing non-survey techniques show disadvantages com-
pared to our approach. All of them lack a clear theoretical foundation. The
existing gravity approaches are rather expensive and focus on the multi-regional
level. The LQ techniques are not consistent. The original SDP technique is con-
sistent but precludes cross-hauling. Finally, our approach can be best compared
with the CHARM by Kronenberg (2009) because we share the idea that product
heterogeneity is behind the cross-hauling of commodities. However, neither is
this technique explicitly derived from theory nor does it exhibit the desirable
scaling property of our approach mentioned above.
Finally, in order to evaluate the performance of our approach, we conducted
an empirical test with survey data for nine Japanese regions. We find that it
generally performs fairly well in estimating internal trade, although the per-
formance significantly differs across industries and regions. Most importantly,
the estimates of our three-regions approach do not seem to be systematically
biased, which is a common critique of existing non-survey techniques. However,
since distance parameters for service industries are usually not available from
international gravity studies, we suggest modelers to apply our three-regions
approach to manufacturing industries only and to rely on our two-regions
approach for the service industries. Last but not least, we have also compared
estimates with the commonly used SDP technique CHARM and find that we
generally perform better.
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a appendix to chapter 2
For ease of notation, we define Vr := (xr + yr + zr)/2 and Sr :=
√
V2r − xryr,
such that (2.19) reads trr = Vr − Sr.
a.1 Proof of the internal trade equation (2.19)
In the following, we omit the industry index i up to Appendix A.5. The bi-
proportional system (2.13)-(2.17) can be solved analytically for trr by the follow-
ing manipulations. By multiplying (2.14) and (2.16), we obtain
xryr = t2rr + trr(trw + twr) + trwtwr. (2.41)
Further, adding up (2.14) and (2.16), and multiplying both sides with trr, results
in
trr(xr + yr) = 2t2rr + trr(trw + twr). (2.42)
Then, solving (2.42) for trr(trw + twr) and inserting into (2.41) yields
t2rr − trr (xr + yr + zr) + xryr = 0, (2.43)
with zr = trwtwr/trr. Finally, solving the quadratic equation (2.43) for trr leads
to two possible solutions
trr1,2 = Vr ±
√
V2r − xryr. (2.44)
For the expression under the square-root in (2.44) we get
V2r − xryr ≥
(xr + yr)2
4
− xryr = (x
2
r − 2xryr + y2r )
4
=
(xr − yr)2
4
≥ 0. (2.45)
Both solutions are thus real. As Vr ≥ (xr + yr)/2 ≥ min(xr, yr), the larger
solution (the one with (‘+’) yields trr > min(xr, yr) if zr > 0 or xr 6= yr. Hence,
the larger solution cannot apply. For the smaller solution we obtain trr ≥ 0,
because Sr ≤ Vr. Furthermore,
trr ≤ min(xr, yr) (2.46)
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is immediate from trr = min(xr, yr) for zr = 0 (see A.5) and ∂trr/∂zr = 1/2−
Vr/2Sr ≤ 0 (see A.3). Thus, the smaller solution of (2.44) (the one with ‘−’)
applies, leading to internal trade equation (2.19).
a.2 Measuring the size of the world market
Let us consider the economic size of the world market increases while the
region’s remains small. The question is what happens to the relevant world
market zr. Thus, we consider the limit of zr = twwRr = (xw − twr)Rr for xw
tending to infinity, while both, xr and yr remain finite. Then, tww = xw − twr
also tends to infinity, because twr ≤ yr remains finite. But regarding Rr, we
need to consider two cases of a limiting process: 1) When xw tends to infinity,
Rr tends to some positive constant. Then, zr tends to infinity and trr thus tends
to zero. The same holds true if we plug in z˜r rather than zr. And 2), when xw
tends to infinity, Rr tends to zero. Then, z˜r − zr = (xw − tww)Rr = twrRr also
tends to zero, because twr ≤ yr remains finite. To summarize, in both cases z˜r
or zr deliver the same result in the limit i.e. if the region under study is small
compared to the rest of world. A similar argument holds for measuring the size
of the world market by yw.
a.3 Proof of the general scaling properties (2.25),(2.26) and (2.28)
In the following, we also omit the region index r up to Appendix A.6. The
change of t due to a change of x is given by
∂t
∂x
=
1
2
− V − y
2S
=
S−V + y
2S
=
m
m + e + z
≥ 0. (2.47)
Similar operations yield ∂t/∂y and ∂t/∂z. We disregard the case m + e + z = 0
that can only occur if z = 0 and x = y, as is immediate from A.5 below.
a.4 Proof of the simultaneous scaling property (2.27)
If ρ > 1, then
t(ρx, ρy, z) ≥ t(ρx, ρy, ρz) = ρt(x, y, z).
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The inequality follows from ∂t/∂z ≤ 0, the equality is obvious from internal
trade equation (2.19) which is jointly linear homogenous in x, y and z.
a.5 Proof of the limit properties (2.29)-(2.30)
For z = 0, trade equation (2.19) reads
t = (x + y)/2−
√
(x + y)2/4− xy
= (x + y)/2−
√
(x2 − 2xy + y2)/4
= (x + y)/2− |x− y|/2
= min(x, y).
As to the other end, let t and t∗ be solutions for z and z∗ ≤ z and given x and y.
Hence, t∗ ≥ t due to ∂t/∂z ≤ 0. Thus,
t =
xy
x + y + z− t ≤
xy
x + y + z− t∗ . (2.48)
Taking the limit of (2.48) for z→ ∞ yields t→ 0.
a.6 Rewriting CHARM as an internal trade equation
In its original form, CHARM estimates the sectoral trade volume vir by
vir =
∣∣∣xir − yir∣∣∣+ hir(xir + yir), (2.49)
with vir := eir + mir, which is supposed to also hold for the nation, i.e. r = n. In
the following, we again omit industry index i. hr ∈ [0, 1] is a factor representing
sectoral product heterogeneity that accounts for cross-hauling and is obtained
from the national I-O table as
hr = hn =
vn − |bn|
xn + yn
,
where bn is the trade balance such that the nominator is the amount of cross-
hauling. Using vr = er +mr = (xr− tr) + (yr− tr) = xr + yr− 2tr and xr + yr−
|xr − yr| = 2 min (xr, yr), (2.49) can be rewritten as
trr = min (xr, yr)− hr xr + yr2 . (2.50)
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a.7 Internal trade estimates for Japan
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics for estimating internal trade and output multipliers in a
multi-regional I-O table for Japan (2005)
Source: Authors’ calculations. The survey data is from the Ministry of Econ-
omy, Trade and Industry (2010).
Note: GRETA1, Two-regions Gravity Regionalization of Trade Approach;
GRETA2, Three-regions Gravity Regionalization of Trade Approach;
CHARM1, Cross-Hauling Adjusted Regionalization Method by Kronenberg
(2009); CHARM2, Corrected CHARM1 formula from Többen and Kronenberg
(2015).
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a.8 Sectoral internal trade estimates for Japan
Figure 2.2: Sectoral internal trade estimates for the province of Hokkaido as the natural
logarithm of deviations from the survey data, ln(tˆirr/tirr).
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Figure 2.3: Sectoral internal trade estimates for the province of Tohoku as the natural
logarithm of deviations from the survey data, ln(tˆirr/tirr).
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Figure 2.4: Sectoral internal trade estimates for the province of Kanto as the natural
logarithm of deviations from the survey data, ln(tˆirr/tirr).
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Figure 2.5: Sectoral internal trade estimates for the province of Chubu as the natural
logarithm of deviations from the survey data, ln(tˆirr/tirr).
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Figure 2.6: Sectoral internal trade estimates for the province of Kinki as the natural
logarithm of deviations from the survey data, ln(tˆirr/tirr).
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Figure 2.7: Sectoral internal trade estimates for the province of Chugoku as the natural
logarithm of deviations from the survey data, ln(tˆirr/tirr).
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Figure 2.8: Sectoral internal trade estimates for the province of Shikoku as the natural
logarithm of deviations from the survey data, ln(tˆirr/tirr).
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Figure 2.9: Sectoral internal trade estimates for the province of Kyushu as the natural
logarithm of deviations from the survey data, ln(tˆirr/tirr).
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Figure 2.10: Sectoral internal trade estimates for the province of Okinawa as the natural
logarithm of deviations from the survey data, ln(tˆirr/tirr).
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a.9 Poisson Quasi-Maximum Likelihood gravity estimation with fixed effects
The distance parameters provided in Table 2.2 are obtained from a gravity
estimation at commodity level with international trade data by Meier (2018).
The natural procedure would be to log-linearize (2.8) or any other gravity
model, add a disturbence term, and fit the resulting equation by ordinary
least squares (OLS). But this procedure is not compatible with the observed
data which includes a significant amount of zero trade flows. Therefore, an
alternative and nowadays standard procedure in the gravity trade literature is to
apply a Poisson Quasi-Maximum Likelihood (PQML) estimation as suggested
by e.g. Bröcker and Rohweder (1990). In the following, we omit industry index
i. The estimation equation reads
tkl = exp(βk + θl − η ln dkl + xklδ) + ekl ∀ k, l; l 6= k (2.51)
with k, l = 1, ..., N countries.
The bilateral trade flow values tkl from exporter k to importer l are obtained
from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade)
for N = 207 countries in the year 2014. The parameters βk and θl are N exporter
and importer fixed effects, respectively. The distance dkl in 1000km is the
cheapest route over land and sea between trading partners.11 The parameter of
interest is η = φζ(σ− 1). In international gravity studies, it is usually assumed
that l 6= k ∀ k, l such that there are no internal distances that need to be
approximated by e.g. area sizes, i.e. φ = 1. Thus, applying our three-regions
approach with the distance parameters inferred from (2.51) implies that the
region under study is of longitudinal (φ = 1) rather than of circular shape
(φ = 0.5). This is suitable for our empirical test of Japan where geography
looks more like a narrow band rather than a circle. However, in the case of
geographically more compact regions, the η’s are expected to be smaller than
inferred from (2.51). Besides geographical distance, trade barriers are assumed
to depend on K further variables defined by the 1× K row vector xkl with K× 1
column parameter vector δ. It includes dummy variables for neighbouring
countries, colonial relationships, and membership in preference areas (i.e. a
free trade agreement, a customs union or a common market). Finally, ekl is a
random disturbance.
11 For further information, I refer to Meier (2018).
3
R E G I O N A L E C O N O M I C I M PA C T S O F R E N E WA B L E
E N E R G I E S
This chapter has not been published yet. It may be referenced as:
Burmeister, Johannes (2018). Regional Economic Impacts of Renewable
Energies. Mimeo, University of Kiel.
Abstract: This paper quantifies the regional income and employment effects
of the renewable electricity expansion plans of the state of Schleswig-Holstein
(S-H), Germany for the year 2030 by means of a computable general equilibrium
(CGE) model. Methodologically, the model is based on supply and use tables
which allow for introducing multi-output firms into the model. Renewable
electricity producing firms are modeled with survey information on regional
component-wise input costs. The labor market allows for unemployment via
the wage curve, and tax income results take into account the German tax
revenue sharing scheme such that we present net results. We find that the
general equilibrium effects on the economy of S-H are rather small. The main
income effects result from feed-in compensations and land ownership. Under
the old feed-in scheme, the expansion leads to a 0.95% (or 715mne p.a.) higher
regional GDP, a wage increase of 0.2% and 1,424 new jobs from 2030 onwards.
Under the new tender scheme, income effects are considerably lower because
competition between renewable firms drives profits to zero. However, the labor
income, rents from land ownership, as well as wage and employment effects
remain stable under both schemes.
Keywords: Renewable energy, computable general equilibrium, regional eco-
nomic impacts, feed-in tariff, tender scheme
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3.1 introduction
Germany is often considered as a role model for a successful transition from
conventional to renewable energy sources. In fact, during the last two decades
the German Renewable Energies Act (EEG) led to a successful expansion and
market penetration of renewable energies. Regarding the electricity market,
the production more than quadrupled from 36 TWh in 2000 to 188 TWh in
2017. However, the economic efficiency of expanding renewables has caused
ongoing and controversial debates in politics, businesses, academia and the
media. Therefore, the EEG has been revised five times since its introduction in
2000.
The latest revision in 2017 introduced a fundamental change in the com-
pensating scheme of renewable electricity. It replaced the feed-in by a tender
scheme and thus changed from a price to a quantity mechanism in which the
government issues a fixed, technology-specific quantity of installed capacity
which the most favorable bidders win and build. Primarily, the tender scheme is
supposed to increase cost efficiency by preventing over-subsidization through
competitive pricing. Moreover, the introduction of a quantity mechanism aims
to better control the further expansion because the ramped construction of wind
energy, biogas and photovoltaic plants also implies negative externalities such
as falling house prices, noise, and impairments of the landscape and wildlife
(Drewitt and Langston, 2006; Dröes and Koster, 2016; Gibbons, 2015; Knopper
and Ollson, 2011; Sunak and Madlener, 2016).
In fact, although 93% of the German population are in favor of renewables,
only 52% would accept a wind turbine in their direct neighborhood (AEE,
2016). These ‘not in my backyard’ positions cannot be ignored by regional
policy makers. Therefore, in the past citizen-owned wind farms have been an
important regional profit-sharing scheme which constitute strong arguments
for policy makers to back the further expansion in their communities. Also at
the national level, the German government reaffirmed that the transition from
conventional to renewable energy can only succeed with citizens’ involvement.
Therefore, the EEG 2017 facilitates the tender participation of citizen-owned
wind farms. However, the latest tenders have been mainly won by large project
developers disguised as citizen projects (Wetzel, 2017). Whether these projects
will be realized and citizens involved adequately thus remains an open issue.
The transition from conventional to renewable energy sources also requires
the transition from a centralized to a more decentralized energy generation
infrastructure because renewables are dependent on the elements of nature,
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which are scarce in some regions and plentiful in others. The state of Schleswig-
Holstein (S-H) in northern Germany, surrounded by the North and Baltic Sea,
has plenty of wind and is one of the leading states in expanding renewable
electricity, especially wind energy. In 1983, ‘GROWIAN’, at that time with 3MW
installed capacity the world’s largest wind turbine, was built in S-H. Thirty-three
years later in 2016, 19 TWh or 10% of total national renewable electricity was
produced in S-H whereas the state only constitutes 2.8% of national GDP. The
share of produced renewable electricity to total gross electricity consumption is
122% compared to 32% nationwide. Therefore, most of the electricity is directed
to southern parts of Germany via the continuously expanded grid.
The local government aims to more than double renewable electricity produc-
tion by the year 2030. The political tenor is that renewables do not only mitigate
CO2 emissions but also lead to regional income and employment. Many wind
farms in S-H are citizen-owned, which increases acceptance due to regional
profit-sharing.1 In addition, landowners profit from rents. As an income exam-
ple, in 2013 the average income in the village ‘Reußenköge’ in the county North
Frisia was 109,387e per person compared to 35,443e statewide because most
citizens are shareholders of the local wind farm (Statistikamt Nord, 2017). In
the past, wind farms have generated high profits due to much lower levelized
costs of electricity (lcoe) than revenues from government-guaranteed feed-in
compensations. Therefore, the question is how large the income (and employ-
ment) effects of the ambitious government expansion targets until 2030 will
be and whether income effects will change significantly under the new tender
scheme. The aim of this paper is thus to quantify the income and employment
effects by means of a regional computable general equilibrium (CGE) model as
well as to compare the results of the old feed-in with the new tender scheme.
This paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to quantify the regional
income and employment effects of the renewables expansion in Germany in
a CGE framework.2 Several previous studies with similar objectives show cer-
tain methodological disadvantages. In a series of studies for German states,
Hirschl et al. (2010, 2015, 2012) quantify the regional value added and employ-
ment effects of the construction and operation of renewable plants by means
of supply chain analysis and find significant effects for the states of Berlin,
Sachsen-Anhalt, Hessen and Baden-Württemberg. Ulrich et al. (2012) quantify
the employment effects for all states by means of a regional allocation model
1 For example, in the county of ‘North Frisia’ 90% of wind farms are citizen-owned (windcomm,
2010).
2 For an overview, see Jenniches (2018), Table 8
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combined with a national input-output (I-O) model. Finally, Bröcker et al. (2014,
2016) quantify income and employment effects of the expansion targets of S-H
until 2020 by means of supply chain analysis combined with a regional I-O
model. However, the main disadvantage of all aforementioned studies is that
they only quantify gross income and employment effects. Thus, they do not take
into account crowding-out effects in other industries as well as offsetting effects
due to price changes. An exception is the work of Többen (2017), who quantifies
the regional net impacts of promoting renewable energies by means of a multi-
regional price and quantity I-O model. However, the modeling approach also
shows certain disadvantages to a CGE approach by assuming fixed technology
input coefficients and no supply constraints. Therefore, the following paper
contributes to the existing literature by extending the methodology of Bröcker
et al. (2014, 2016) to a CGE approach. The major advantage of a CGE compared
to an I-O model is that it is based on microeconomic general equilibrium theory
and thus captures all quantity and price adjustments, for example due to an
energy or climate policy intervention, in a closed and theoretically consistent
framework. Finally, compared to previous studies, the following paper also
contributes to research on the acceptance of renewable energy by comparing
income effects under different compensating schemes. As mentioned above,
regional profit-sharing schemes are important for regional policy makers in
order to back up future expansion targets. However, since the latest EEG revi-
sion buried the feed-in scheme, the question is whether the new tender scheme
leads to significantly smaller income effects and thus dampens the acceptance
of renewables expansion.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 gives an
overview of the modeling setup. After describing the basic ideas of the regional
model, we introduce the formal structure. The basic presentation of technologies
and preferences mainly follows Bröcker (2015). The section closes by describing
the data and its regional break down for the state of S-H. In Section 3.3, the
general equilibrium conditions are described. In order to account for unem-
ployment in S-H, we then extend the model by introducing an imperfect labor
market. An important part of static CGE modeling is to define how the model
is closed with respect to parts of the economy which would usually incorporate
dynamic behaviour such as investment and saving decisions. These ‘closure
rules’ are described in Section 3.3.2. Finally, the reference equilibrium is solved
with benchmark data for S-H in 2014. Since this paper aims at quantifying
regional income and employment effects of the renewables expansion, we de-
sign counterfactual equilibria which reflect the expansion plans of the local
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government for the year 2030 at the end of Section 3.3. The model is solved
for these counterfactual equilibria in Section 3.4, presenting comparative static
income and employment results of the local expansion plans. In order to check
for the robustness of the results, it follows a sensitivity analysis with respect
to various substitution elasticities as well as one of the closure rules. Finally,
Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 the model
3.2.1 Basic ideas
We set up a model for a small open economy that represents the region of
S-H. It is based on a standard Shoven-Whalley CGE framework with a static
economy, constant returns to scale, perfect competition and taxes in the data
(Shoven and Whalley, 1984). The main advantages of a CGE compared to
an I-O approach is that we are able to take into account supply constraints
of the economy, substitution possibilities of firms and households and price
changes on all markets of S-H. We follow a single-region approach in which
the region of S-H is trading goods with the rest of the world (ROW), whereby
the ROW is not explicitly modeled. Therefore, external trade of the region with
the ROW comprises flows to and from the rest of Germany as well as foreign
countries. We assume that there is two-way trade of any good i.e. cross-hauling
and that local goods and externally traded goods, although having the same
commodity classification, are imperfect substitutes. Thus, we follow the so-
called Armington assumption (Armington, 1969). Given that the economy of
S-H is small compared to the ROW, prices in the ROW for the externally traded
goods are assumed to be given. This means that S-H imports and exports goods
at a fixed price. The exchange of goods with the ROW leads to corresponding
capital flows, namely capital exports and imports. In our model, we summarize
these flows as well as all other potential capital flows (e.g. portfolio investments
and social transfers) as the net flow of funds, which can be either positive or
negative depending on S-H’s trade balance, debt position and so forth.
Figure 3.1 summarizes the economic interactions in the model of S-H where
the arrows point in the direction of the financial flow. We assume two types of
activities in the region, production, which is done by a number of representative
firms, and final use, which is the activity of a number of representative house-
holds. The latter include private households, the government, and investment.
The activities take place on markets as follows.
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Firms buy intermediate and factor inputs on which they both pay marginal
taxes. Further, they import goods from the ROW. They earn revenue from
selling goods to local markets and to the ROW. Firms maximize profits, which
implies that in equilibrium prices equal minimal unit cost and no profits are
left.
Private households consume goods on which they pay value added tax. They
earn income by selling primary factors to firms. The local government of S-H
consumes goods and earns income by collecting taxes. Any differences between
consumption expenditures and earnings indicate either positive or negative net
flow of funds with the ROW. Both private households and the local government
maximize utility under their budget constraint. In contrast, local investment
demand is assumed to be exogenous.
In the reference situation, the economy of S-H in the year 2014 is assumed
to be in equilibrium, meaning that supply equals demand on all markets, unit
revenue equals unit cost for all firms, and the budgets of all households are
balanced. In case of an external shock to the regional economy such as the
renewables expansion, we calculate the resulting counterfactual equilibrium.
By comparing the reference situation with the counterfactual i.e. comparative
statics, we then quantify the resulting output, income and price changes due
to the shock. Given that we model the economy of S-H in a single-region
framework, we do not capture any feedback effects of the regional expansion
on the rest of the German economy.
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Figure 3.1: Economic interactions in the CGE model of Schleswig-Holstein
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3.2.2 Formal structure
We begin by introducing the subscripts of activities and markets appearing in
the model. There are y ∈ Y = {1, . . . , 146} activities taking place on m ∈ M =
{1, . . . , 240} markets. The activities Y comprise production of firms j ∈ J =
{1, . . . , 142} ⊆ Y and final use of households h ∈ H = {143, . . . , 146} ⊆ Y. For
the purpose of the paper, firms and households are further sub-categorized
into three types of firms and four types of households as follows.
Firms f ∈ F = {1, . . . , 61} ⊆ J represent all major industries of S-H such as
agriculture, shipping, construction, tourism and financial services (see Table 3.2).
Firms a ∈ A = {62 : 139} ⊆ J are ‘Armington composing firms’, which
incorporate external trade with the ROW into the model. Finally, firms z ∈
Z = {140 : 142} ⊆ J represent the renewable electricity producing firms wind
onshore, wind offshore and photovoltaic. Since the local government does not
56 regional economic impacts of renewable energies
plan to expand electricity production from biogas, it is not considered in the
model.
The four types of households are defined as follows. Household o = 143
represents the average household living in S-H. Most importantly, this house-
hold is characterized as a ‘wind outsider’ with no possibility to invest in a
citizen-owned wind farm in S-H because it lives in a municipality with no
suitable land or other restrictions for wind or photovoltaic farms.3 In contrast,
household w = 144 is a ‘wind insider’. The share of wind insiders in the total
population of S-H and thus in consumption and endowments is ω = 1%. This
is roughly the share of people living in municipalities with citizen-owned wind
farms. Household w has the same consumption patterns and endowments as
household o, but, in addition, earns profits of renewable firms Z as well as rents
from land ownership. The public sector of S-H is treated as another household
g = 145 representing the local government, which consumes goods and earns
tax income. Finally, a household v = 146 represents investment demand.
The markets M comprise local and foreign markets. Local markets and
corresponding goods and factors are the following. Local goods d ∈ D =
{1, . . . , 78} ⊆ M are locally produced goods for the local market. Commodities
i ∈ I = {79, . . . , 156} ⊆ M are a composite of a local good d and an imported
good im, which are bought by firms as intermediate inputs and by households
as final use. Factor markets are labor l = 157 and capital k = 158. Finally,
foreign markets f m ∈ FM = {159, . . . , 240} ⊆ M are either exports EX to the
ROW in the use table or imports IM from the ROW in the supply table, which
both serve as the main data input for the model.
3.2.2.1 Firms
The production side of the economy of S-H is represented by firms F comprising
all major industries and services, Armington firms A and renewable firms Z.
One can think of a representative firm as the aggregation of several production
plants operating in the same industry. For instance, the shipping firm represents
the production of all shipyards in S-H because the aggregate profit obtained
by each price-taking shipyard that maximizes profits separately is the same as
if all shipyards were to coordinate their actions in a joint profit maximizing
decision (cf. Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Proposition 5.E.1). This applies irrespective
of the individual shipyard’s production technology. The separation of firm
activities and commodities in the underlying supply and use (S-U) tables
3 For ease of presentation, I refer the outsider and insider to the technology wind.
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permits any activity to produce multiple commodities and any commodity
to be produced by multiple activities.4 This is a major advantage compared
to other CGE models, which usually assume single-output firms. The input-
output structure of a firm is shown in Figure 3.2. Again, the arrows point
in the direction of the financial flow. For the sake of simplicity, we begin by
assuming non-nested functional forms. Later, we introduce and apply nested
functions. A representative firm j producing at activity level xj buys multiple
inputs am,jxj in order to transform them into xj units of a throughput. The
throughput is in turn the only input to produce multiple outputs bm,jxj. The
input and output coefficients am,j and bm,j indicate the cost-minimal input m per
unit of throughput and the revenue-maximal output m per unit of throughput,
respectively. Inputs are bought at customer prices pˆm = pm(1+ τˆm), where pm
are market prices and τˆm are commodity specific tax rates. Outputs are sold at
market prices pm.
Figure 3.2: Input-output structure of a firm
xj
pm . . . pm
ηj
σj
pˆm . . . pˆm
The throughput assumption is necessary because there is no information
which of the inputs relate to the multiple outputs of a firm. Thus, in order to
increase the output of a certain good m, firm j minimizes costs with respect
to the price vector of all inputs which are necessary for the production of the
throughput. We assume CES unit cost functions for firms J,
cj(pˆ) =
(
∑
m
αm,j pˆ
1−σj
m
) 1
1−σj
∀ j ∈ J, (3.1)
4 A comprehensive description of the database for the CGE model, especially the S-U tables, will
be given at the end of this section.
58 regional economic impacts of renewable energies
with constant elasticity of substitution σj ≥ 0 and position parameter αm,j. If
the cost function is differentiable at pˆ, and pˆm ≥ 0 ∀ m, Sherphard’s lemma
implies that cost-minimizing input coefficients are given by
am,j =
∂cj(pˆ)
∂ pˆm
= αm,j
(
pˆm
cj
)−σj
. (3.2)
Analogously, on the output side we assume CET unit revenue functions for
firms J,
rj(p) =
(
∑
m
βm,j p
1+ηj
m
) 1
1+ηj
∀ j ∈ J, (3.3)
with constant elasticity of transformation ηj ≥ 0 and position parameter βm,j.
The CET form depicts a firm’s optimal unit revenue given the output prices of
goods M. As above, revenue-maximizing output coefficients are given by
bm,j =
∂r(p)
∂pm
= βm,j
(
pm
rj
)ηj
. (3.4)
The only difference to the input side is the reversed sign before the ηj in (3.3)
and (3.4). Hence, ηj determines the degree of transformability between multiple
outputs instead of substitutability between inputs. Say, relative output prices
increase by 1%. Then, firm j increases relative output quantities by ηj%. Finally,
we assume zero profits5 for all firms J, i.e.
Pj = rj(p)− cj(pˆ) = 0 ∀ j ∈ J \ Z, (3.5)
where Pj denotes unit profits.
In order to apply the input-output structure of firms as above, we lack
estimates of position parameters αm,j and βm,j as well as elasticities σj and ηj.
In the following, we only refer to the input side because similar operations
apply to the output side. Since it is not possible to estimate σj based on a single
observation of S-H’s economy in 2014, elasticities are taken from empirical
estimates in the literature. Once elasticities are determined in this way, we are
able to fix position parameters αm,j such that (3.1) reproduces the unit cost
benchmark data. This procedure is called calibration, assuming the benchmark
data to be an initial observable equilibrium. In other words, given σj, unit cost
5 The zero profit assumption does not apply to renewable firms z under the feed-in scheme which
we will describe at the end of this section.
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functions are completely specified by the benchmark data which we denote by
the superscript 0. This becomes more obvious from the calibrated form of (3.1),
which is commonly used in applied modeling. It is obtained by rearranging
(3.2) to
αm,j = a0m,j
(
c0j
pˆ0m
)−σj
, (3.6)
with benchmark input coefficients
a0m,j =
V0m,j/ pˆ
0
m
V0j /c
0
j
, (3.7)
where pˆ0m are benchmark input prices, V0m,j is the value of input m bought by
firm j, and V0j is the total value of inputs bought by firm j. The latter two can
be obtained from the benchmark use table. The benchmark cost per unit of
activity of firm j, c0j , is the benchmark CES price index. Plugging (3.6) into (3.1)
leads to
c(pˆ) = c0j
(
∑
m
v0m
(
pˆm
pˆ0m
)1−σj) 11−σj
(3.8)
(see Appendix A.2). As obvious from (3.8), the calibrated form is completely
specified by benchmark data, whereas αm,j is only implicitly given in (3.8). The
term v0m,j = a
0
m,j pˆ
0
m/c0j is the benchmark value cost share of input m. Taking the
derivative of (3.8) with respect to input prices leads to input coefficients
am,j =
∂c(pˆ)
∂ pˆm
= a0m,j
(
cj/c0j
pˆm/ pˆ0m
)σj
, (3.9)
which is shown in Appendix A.3.
The CES technology assumed so far is more flexible than the Cobb-Douglas
or Leontief technology but still not very flexible because we can choose only
one σj. Therefore, we assume a yet more flexible nested CES form (Sato, 1967).
The general idea is that a CES unit cost function with, say, three inputs can be
formulated as the combination of the CES unit cost function of the first two
inputs (first nest) which is then nested into a CES unit cost function combining
it with the third input (second nest). In this way, more flexibility comes with
the nest specific elasticity of substitution σj at each nest n.
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The nested input-output structure of a local firm f is depicted in Figure 3.3.
Firm f buys multiple inputs in order to transform them into multiple outputs
which are either sold to local markets D or to export markets EX. Given that
the economy of S-H is small compared to the ROW, we assume that prices in
the ROW are fix. Therefore, all exported goods EX are sold at a fixed price
which we denote by e¯, i.e. pex = e¯ for all EX. All elasticity parameter values are
given in Table 3.2. On nest n = 1, firm f buys material (and service) inputs with
substitutability σf ,mat. Factor inputs k and l are substituted with σf ,kl at n = 2.
Fossil energy inputs coal, oil and gas are substituted with σf ,en at n = 3. Nest
n = 4 combines electricity with the fossil energy aggregate with substitutability
σf ,ene. The capital-labor aggregate and energy-electricity aggregate is combined
with substitutability σf ,kle at n = 5. Finally, the most upper nest on the input
side, n = 6, combines material inputs and the capital-labor-energy aggregate
with σf ,klem. The transformability between multiple outputs of local and export
goods is given by the CET’s η f ,d and η f ,ex at nest n = 8 and n = 9, respectively.
The most upper nest on the output side, n = 7, indicates the transformability
between local and export goods by η f ,dex. It indicates the percentage change in
the supply ratio of local good d to exported good ex given a percentage change
in the ratio of the local price pd to the ROW price e¯. The larger η f ,dex in absolute
value, the more sensitive is the supply ratio to a change in relative prices. For
example, if the relative price of local to exported ships decreases, shipyards in
S-H are more flexible to sell their ships to export markets if η f ,dex is high and
vice versa.
Figure 3.3: CES nesting structure of a local firm f
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The input-output structure of a firm a is depicted in Figure 3.4. Firm a buys
a local and an imported good in order to transform them into a commodity i,
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which is in turn bought by firms and households for intermediate and final
use. Thus, for each commodity i, we introduce a corresponding ‘Armington
composing firm’ a. Analogously to the exported goods of firms F, the imported
goods are bought at the fixed ROW price pim = e¯ for all IM. The so-called
Armington trade elasticity σa describes the substitutability between a local
and an imported input and is taken from Aguiar et al. (2016). It indicates the
percentage change in the demand ratio of a local good d to an imported good
im given a percentage change in the ratio of the local price pd to the ROW price
e¯.
Figure 3.4: Input-output structure of an Armington firm a
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3.2.2.2 Renewables
So far, firms are assumed to act on perfectly competitive input and output
markets. However, this applies only partly to renewable electricity producing
firms Z acting on the regulated electricity market of S-H. The input-output
structure of a firm z is shown in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Input-output structure of a renewable firm z
x¯z
p¯rele or p˜rele
σz = 0
pˆi . . . pˆi pˆk pˆl `
A renewable firm z buys multiple inputs with Leontief technology in order
to export electricity to the ROW. Besides buying intermediate and factor inputs,
it pays a lumpsum rent to landowners denoted by `. According to survey data
from Bröcker et al. (2014), this rent is considerably higher than the average rent
for agricultural land because land which is suitable for wind farms is scarce and
stipulated by the government. Suitable land is restricted to so-called ‘priority
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areas’ which account for only around 2% (31,353 ha) of the total land area in
S-H.6 Therefore, agricultural land cannot simply be transformed into land for
wind farms; whether farmers are able to supply suitable land is rather a lottery.
Moreover, in contrast to the land requirements for biogas plants, wind farms
require relatively little land of around 4 ha per wind turbine. These include
a compensation measure of around 1.4 ha for intervening in the landscape
and nature according to the Nature Conservation Act. Henning et al. (2014)
find that this compensation measure has only little effect on average rents for
agricultural land in S-H. Thus, given the lack of a settlement mechanism for
wind land as well as the negligible effects of the compensation measure on
rents for agricultural land, we do not assume land as an additional factor input
with associated market price but assume a lumpsum rent ` directly paid to the
wind insider household w. The exported electricity is either remunerated at
exogenous compensations p¯rele under the feed-in scheme or at endogenous mill
prices p˜rele under the tender scheme. The subscript rele denotes the respective
technology wind onshore, wind offshore, or photovoltaic.
Under the feed-in scheme, the output side is non-competitive because a firm
z sells at a fixed, technology-specific compensation p¯rele stipulated by the gov-
ernment. In practice, p¯rele is stipulated by the German government and usually
much higher than the electricity spot price at the European Power Exchange
(EPEX). The difference is a technology-specific Renewable Energies Act levy
(EEG-Umlage) to be paid by households. Thus, households pay a levy (or
subsidy) s¯rele = p¯rele − e¯. This levy is partly paid by households in S-H and the
ROW, whereby households in S-H pay only a small share.7 In addition to a
fixed compensation, a firm z produces at a fixed activity level x¯z. Thus, the
government does not only stipulate p¯rele, but also sets a cap x¯z on renewable
electricity production. Given p¯rele and x¯z, the zero profit condition from (3.5)
does no longer hold. Suppose that x¯z is fix but prele is flexible. If input prices pˆ
would decrease due to an external shock, prele would adjust accordingly such
that (3.5) holds. If, by contrast, xz is flexible but p¯rele is fix and input prices pˆ
would decrease, xz would adjust accordingly such that (3.5) holds. But with
both price and output fixed, unit profits of renewable firms Pz are endogenous
and either less or greater than zero, i.e.
Pz = rz( p¯rele)− cz(pˆ) 6= 0 ∀ z ∈ Z. (3.10)
6 The restrictions include minimum distances to residential areas and nature reserves, among
many others.
7 In practice, a part of the total levies are paid by the rest of Germany which is, however, not
differentiated from the ROW in this single-region model for S-H.
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Under the tender scheme, both the output and input side are competitive. In
practice, the German government tenders a total amount of renewable electricity
and firms bid on producing a share of this amount at a certain bid price. The
firms that offer the lowest prices win the bids. If a firm’s bid price is higher than
its unit cost, it makes a profit. The scheme is competitive if the total cumulated
electricity production that is being offered in the bids exceeds the electricity
production that is being tendered by the government. The scheme is supposed
to increase competition among renewable electricity producers. Here, we do
not model the technology-specific tender markets explicitly, but assume that a
tender market is represented by a firm z that bids at an endogenous price p˜rele to
which it covers its unit cost. That is, a firm z is willing to produce a stipulated
output level x¯z if it is able to break even such that the zero profit condition
Pz = rz( p˜rele)− cz(pˆ) = 0 ∀ z ∈ Z (3.11)
holds. The break even is attained by a corresponding unknown levy srele =
p˜rele − e¯ to be paid by households.
3.2.2.3 Households
The consumption side of the economy is represented by a wind outsider house-
hold o, a wind insider household w, the local government g, and investment
demand v. In contrast with the theory of aggregate production, the aggregation
of individual consumers to representative households underlies a very restric-
tive condition on preferences. That is, aggregate demand must be independent
of the income distribution among individual consumers i.e. depend solely on
prices and aggregate income. This property holds if and only if consumers’ indi-
rect utility can be represented by functions of the Gorman form (cf. Mas-Colell
et al., 1995, Proposition 4.B.1). One special case of this general form arises when
consumers have identical preferences that are homothetic, as assumed in the
following.
Again, we begin by assuming non-nested functional forms. Household pref-
erences are completely specified by the expenditure function which we assume
to be of the CES form
eh( pˆi, uh) = uhpih = uh
(
∑
i
γi,h pˆ
1−σh
i
) 1
1−σh
, (3.12)
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with constant elasticity of substitution σh ≥ 0 and shift parameter γi,h. The CES
price index pih is the cost per unit of utility.
Thus, a sensible measure for a citizen’s consumer price index (CPI) in S-H
would be her cost per unit of utility, i.e. pih/Nh, where Nh is the number of
citizens represented by household h. Then, the overall local CPI in S-H can
be represented by a weighted sum of these individual CPI’s. If we choose as
weights the relative share of citizens Nh in the total population of S-H denoted
by N, i.e. Nh/N, the overall local CPI can simply be defined as Π = ∑h pih.
If (3.12) is differentiable in pˆ, and pˆi ≥ 0 ∀ i, Hotelling’s lemma implies
that a consumer’s Hicksian demand for commodity i is given by
di,h =
∂e(pˆ, uh)
∂ pˆi
= uhγi,h
(
pˆi
pih
)−σh
. (3.13)
By choosing a benchmark utility level of u0h = 1, the calibration of (3.12) is
similar to the calibration of the unit cost function (3.8).
The nesting structure of households is shown in Figure 3.6. Households o, w
and g substitute between material and service commodities with σh,mat = 2 at
nest n = 1. Regarding energy consumption, fossil fuels cannot be substituted i.e.
σh,en = 0 at nest n = 2. The fossil fuel aggregate is nested into the consumption
of electricity with substitutability σh,ene = 0.1 at nest n = 3. The most upper
nest combines the materials and services aggregate and the energy aggregate
with σh,sem = 1. Finally, a household v represents investment demand by buying
commodities i with Leontief preferences at exogenous utility level u¯v.
Figure 3.6: CES nesting structure of a household h
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On the income side, we assume balanced budgets for private households
o and w such that expenditures equal endowments. The budget constraint of
household o is
eo (pˆ, uo) = Eo p˜+ qS¯l,o p¯q − (1−ω)νL− F¯o, (3.14)
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where we denote variables that are not affected by the renewables expansion by
a bar. The first income component Eo p˜ is the factor income of employed wind
outsiders in S-H. It is the scalar product of factor endowments El,o and Ek,o
with respective tax excluding factor prices p˜l = pl(1− τ˜l) and p˜k = pk(1− τ˜k),
where τ˜l and τ˜k are average labor and capital income tax rates, respectively. The
second income component qS¯l,o p¯q is the income of unemployed wind outsiders
in S-H, where q is the unemployment rate, S¯l,o = El,o/(1 − q) is the labor
supply of wind outsiders in the case of full employment, and p¯q is a fixed
unemployment compensation rate.8 The term (1−ω)νL are total levies to be
paid by wind outsiders in S-H, where L is the endogenous total value of EEG
levies for the additional renewable electricity production in S-H due to the
expansion plans. Under the feed-in scheme, it is the difference between feed-in
revenues and revenues at the price in the ROW,
L =∑
rele
∑
z
e¯s¯relebrele,z x¯z, (3.15)
whereas under the tender scheme between total electricity production costs and
revenues at the price in the ROW,
L =∑
rele
∑
z
e¯srelebrele,z x¯z. (3.16)
We denote the share of EEG levies to be paid by private households in S-H by
ν which we assume to be equal to the share of gross electricity consumption
in S-H according to AEE (2017), i.e. ν = 3.5%. Finally, the net flow of funds
F¯o summarizes all residual external flows with the ROW which we assume to
remain constant. These may include portfolio investments and social transfers,
among others. If F¯o > 0, wind outsiders make a net payment to the ROW,
whereas if F¯o < 0, wind outsiders receive a net payment from the ROW.
The budget constraint of wind insider w is similar to (3.14) but with two
additional sources of income, namely profits from renewables and rents from
landownership. It is given by
ew (pˆ, uw) = Ew p˜+ qS¯l,w p¯q + (1− κ)(P˜z + `)−ωνL− F¯w, (3.17)
8 We assume that the unemployment benefits are paid entirely by the ROW. The expansion
of renewables leads to a decrease of the unemployment benefits. Thus, we do not take into
account the hypothetical savings in expenditures for unemployment benefits in S-H. However,
the savings are small and would only occur in the long-run via a premium adjustment for
citizens in S-H.
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where P˜z denotes unit profits of renewables after the deduction of municipal
business taxes. The specific treatment of taxes will be described in the following
section. We denote the flat tax on capital income by κ such that (1− κ)P˜z are net
returns on investments in citizen-owned wind farms and (1− κ)` are net rents
of landowners. The budget constraint under the tender scheme is equivalent to
(3.17) with P˜z = 0.
3.2.2.4 Government
The local government of S-H is assumed to act like a household, consuming
commodities i in order to maximize utility under its budget constraint. It earns
revenue by collecting taxes from firms and households. The budget constraint
of local government g is given by
eg
(
pˆ, ug
)
= (1− θ)Rg − F¯g. (3.18)
The local tax revenue (1− θ)Rg takes into account the German tax revenue
sharing scheme. This scheme stipulates the distribution of tax revenues as
follows. First, the tax revenue is lumped together in a national tax account and
then split between the federal government and the sum of state governments
according to fixed shares (vertical distribution). These shares vary across tax
types. Secondly, the sum of the state governments’ tax revenues is distributed
among the individual states according to the location where the tax was col-
lected (horizontal distribution). Finally, a balancing mechanism redistributes
tax revenues between financially stronger and weaker states (the so-called ‘Län-
derfinanzausgleich’). According to Hentze (2015), this balancing mechanism
leads to a marginal burden rate of θ = 85.5% for S-H in 2014. It indicates how
much of one additional Euro tax income is redistributed from S-H to the rest
of Germany. Thus, Rg in (3.18) comprises tax revenue that accrues to the state
of S-H including municipalities after the vertical but before the horizontal tax
distribution. It is given by
Rg = φ
[
∑
h
(El,hτ˜l,h pl + Ek,hτ˜k,h pk)
]
+
[
µPzψ
]
+ φ
[
κ(P˜z + `)
]
. (3.19)
The first bracket contains revenues from factor income taxes. The second bracket
contains revenues from business taxes which accrue to the municipalities in
which the citizen-owned wind farms are located. Business taxes are calculated
based on earnings which we approximate by the renewable profits Pz. Then,
by applying the base rate of µ = 3.5% and an average, municipality-specific
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assessment rate of ψ = 358%, we obtain total business taxes of renewables in
S-H. The last bracket contains revenues from income taxes on profits and land
rents, where κ = 25% is the flat tax on capital income. Finally, φ = 57.5% is the
fixed share of income tax revenue that accrues to the state of S-H according the
vertical tax revenue distribution scheme (BMF, 2019).
As for the private households, F¯g in (3.18) summarizes all residual external
flows with the ROW which are not affected by the renewables expansion. These
may include tax revenues which accrue to the federal government of Germany
and new borrowing of the local government of S-H, among others. The budget
constraint (3.18) is attained by the unknown utility level ug. This means that a
marginal change in tax revenues Rg due to the renewables expansion leads to
an equal marginal change in local government consumption expenditures.
3.2.3 Data
In order to apply the model, we need various local benchmark data on firms’
output, intermediate inputs, factor inputs, external trade, final use, factor
income and taxes. Most of this data are obtained from the latest national supply
and use (S-U) tables for Germany in 2014 provided by Destatis (2018), which
we regionalize by applying the non-survey I-O method presented in chapter 2.
The general structure of the S-U tables is shown in Table 3.1.
The S-U tables show values in million e which we denote by V. The supply
table shows values of supply of commodity i by firm f at mill prices, V˜0i, f , as
well as total imports of commodity i, V0i,im. The tilde denotes values at mill
prices. It further includes values of trade margins V0i,tm and commodity taxes
V0i,t. Total supply of commodity i is defined as the sum over all columns denoted
by V0i .
The use table shows values of intermediate use of commodity i by firm f ,
Vˆ0i, f , as well as final use both at customer prices denoted by the hat. Final
use comprises consumption of commodity i by private households, Vˆ0i,ph, the
government, Vˆ0i,g, gross investments, Vˆ
0
i,v, and total exports of commodity i, V
0
i,ex.
The total input expenditure of a firm is defined as Vˆ0f := ∑i Vˆ
0
i, f . Total use of
commodity i equals total supply V0i .
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Table 3.1: General structure of the S-U tables for Germany in 2014
S · · · f · · · im tm t ∑
...
.... .
...
...
...
...
i V˜0i, f V
0
i,im V
0
i,tm V
0
i,t V
0
i
...
.... .
...
...
...
...
∑ · · · V˜0f · · · V0im V0tm V0t
U · · · f · · · ph g v ex ∑
...
.... .
...
...
...
...
...
i Vˆ0i, f Vˆ
0
i,ph Vˆ
0
i,g Vˆ
0
i,v V
0
i,ex V
0
i
...
.... .
...
...
...
...
...
l · · · Vˆ0l, f · · · Vˆ0l
k · · · Vˆ0k, f · · · Vˆ0k
∑ · · · Vˆ0f · · · Vˆ0ph Vˆ0g Vˆ0v V0ex
Compared to a symmetric industry-by-industry I-O table, which is usually
used as data input for CGE models, the non-symmetric commodity-by-industry
S-U tables allow for introducing multi-output firms into the model. For instance,
car producers do not only sell cars but also other vehicles and possibly financial
services. This fact is not included in I-O tables since they are constructed from
S-U tables by, among other assumptions, assuming ‘homogeneous branches’
that only produce one type of commodity i.e. single-output firms (Eurostat,
2008). In order to feed the S-U tables into the model, some data manipulation
and extensions are necessary which will be described briefly in the following.
First, we need to regionalize the national S-U tables for S-H because regional
survey tables for Germany are not available. Therefore, we apply GRETA
from chapter 2, where GRETA1 is applied to service sectors and GRETA2 to
manufacturing sectors. Total local supply of each commodity i is obtained by
distributing domestic supply – given by V0i − V0i,im from the national supply
table – with regional employment shares of S-H according to Statistik der
Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2017b). Total local final use over all commodities i
for household and government consumption and for gross investments, Vˆ0ph,
Vˆ0g and Vˆ0v , is obtained from the national accounts of the states according
to Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2017). Final local use for
each commodity i, Vˆ0i,ph, Vˆ
0
i,g and Vˆ
0
i,v, is obtained by applying the relative
consumption shares of the national use table, e.g. Vˆ0i,ph/Vˆ
0
ph. Thus, we assume
that consumers in S-H spend the same relative amount on commodity i than
the average consumer in Germany. Intermediate use of commodity i by firm f ,
Vˆ0i, f , is obtained by assuming the same technical input coefficients in the nation
and region as in Section 2.2.1 of the previous chapter. The sum of intermediate
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and final use subtracted by exports leads to total local use for each commodity
i, i.e. V0i − V0i,ex. Given total local supply and use for each commodity i, we
estimate internal trade and thereby exports and imports in order to complete
the regional S-U tables for S-H.
Secondly, we need to align the prices of the S-U tables because we want to
solve the model for market prices pm. However, the original S-U tables are
valued at mill and customer prices, respectively. The difference between selling
a commodity i at mill price
p˜0i = p
0
i /(1+ µi) (3.20)
in the supply table and buying a commodity i at customer price
pˆ0i,y = p
0
i (1+ τˆi,y) (3.21)
in the use table are trade margin rates µi and tax rates τˆi,y, respectively. Trade
margin rates are only introduced at this point in order to align prices but will
not be modeled explicitly. We distribute the trade margins for commodity i
uniformly across firms. Therefore, in the supply table, the market value of
commodity i supplied by firm f is obtained as
V0i, f = V˜
0
i, f (1+ µi),
where µi = V0i,tm/V
0
tm. In the use table, we distribute the commodity tax data
from the supply table, V0i,t, across households and firms as follows. We assume
that all households, including the government and investment, pay value added
tax τˆi,h of either 7 or 19%. This leaves a residual (either positive or negative)
of the original tax data V0i,t which we distribute uniformly across firms F as
intermediate input taxes (or subsidies) τˆi, f . Therefore, in the use table, the
market value of commodity i used by activity y is obtained as
V0i,y = V˜
0
i,y/(1+ τˆi,y).
As a result, both tables are valued at benchmark market prices p0i .
The benchmark market prices cannot be observed from the data because
the S-U tables are in value data (here mne) and one cannot collect price data
for all industries of the S-U tables. Therefore, we need to separate the price
and quantity data in order to calibrate cost functions (3.1), revenue functions
(3.3), and expenditure functions (3.12). A common way is to fix benchmark
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market prices as well as activity and utility levels to unity, i.e. p0m = 1 ∀ m ∈ M,
x0j = 1 ∀ j ∈ J, and u0h = 1 ∀ h ∈ H. Further, we also fix the price in the ROW
to one, i.e. e¯0 = e¯ = 1. Setting all the benchmark prices to unity is known
as normalizing prices and implies that the initial value data from Table 3.1
becomes the quantity per unit of currency in the benchmark.
Regarding firms, setting the benchmark activity level x f to one implies that
the benchmark unit cost of firm f is equal to the total input expenditures of
firm f from the use table, i.e. c0f = Vˆ
0
f . Further, given that benchmark prices
are equal to one, the benchmark input coefficient (3.7) are the input quantity
of commodity i per unit of activity level of firm f , i.e. a0i, f = V
0
i, f . Similarly,
benchmark unit revenue is equal to the output market value, i.e. r0f = V
0
f . Thus,
the benchmark output coefficient is the output quantity of a good d or ex per
unit of activity level.
Regarding Armington firms A, the benchmark activity level xa = 1 imply
that benchmark unit cost and revenue are equal to total local use of commodity
i, i.e. c0a = r0a = V0i −V0i,ex.
Regarding renewable firms Z, the benchmark data for calibrating cost and
revenue functions are summarized in Table 3.3 of the appendix. The benchmark
unit cost are given by c0z = Vˆ0z , where the total value of input costs of firm z,
Vˆ0z , is obtained as the product of the electricity production in KWh in 2030
and the levelized cost of electricity (lcoe) in e per KWh. The regional input
costs differentiated by cost components, Vˆ0i,z, are obtained from interviews in
Bröcker et al. (2014, 2016). The benchmark revenue under the feed-in scheme is
given by r0z = V¯0rele, where the total value of EEG compensations per technology,
V¯0rele, is obtained as the product of the electricity production in KWh in 2030
and the average technology-specific EEG compensation in e per KWh in 2014.
Given that we fix the electricity spot market price i.e. price in the ROW to one,
a renewable firm exports a quantity of b0rele,z = V
0
rele to the ROW, where the total
market value of electricity per technology, V0rele, is obtained as the product of the
electricity production in KWh in 2030 and the average electricity spot market
price at the European Power Exchange (EPEX) in 2014. Choosing the benchmark
quantity in this way implies that the benchmark feed-in compensation is given
by p¯0rele = V¯
0
rele/V
0
rele. Under the tender scheme, the benchmark revenue of firm z
is given by r0z = V0rele.
Regarding households, setting the benchmark utility level to one implies that
the benchmark cost per unit of utility equals the total benchmark expenditures
from the use table, i.e. e(pˆ0, 1) = pi0h = Vˆ
0
ph. This also means that the overall
local benchmark CPI in S-H is given by total household expenditures, i.e. Π0 =
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∑h pi0h. On the income side, total benchmark factor income of employed private
households in (3.14) and (3.17), E0o and E0w, are obtained as the total factor inputs
of firms f distributed by the wind insider share ω, i.e. E0o = (1−ω)(V0l +V0k )
and E0w = ω(V0l + V
0
k ). The benchmark income of unemployed households,
q0S¯0l p¯q, is obtained with the benchmark unemployment rate q
0 = 0.068 and
the benchmark unemployment compensation rate which is given by p¯0q =
(S¯0l − El) p˜0l (1− q0)/Elq0. As a last step, the benchmark net flows of funds F¯0o
and F¯0w are obtained as residuals. Finally, the benchmark tax income of the local
government, R0g, is obtained with benchmark factor income E0l = ∑ f V
0
l, f and
E0k = ∑ f V
0
k, f and marginal income tax rates τ¯l = τ¯k = 0.3. The government’s
net flow of funds F¯0g is obtained as a residual. The resulting flow of -16.4bne
indicates the local government’s budget deficit.
3.3 general equilibrium
The zero profit conditions for firms, market clearing conditions for goods and
factors, and budget constraints for households yield a system of simultaneous
equations which can be solved for the general equilibrium of the economy with
the benchmark data above. In modern CGE models, this system is usually for-
mulated as a (nonlinear) mixed complementarity problem (MCP) consisting of
weak inequalities with complementary variables as well as additional equations.
The MCP for the model of S-H can be summarized as follows:
rj(p˜)− cj(pˆ) ≤ 0 ⊥ xj ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ J \ Z, (3.22)
∑
j
xj
(
bm,j − am,j
) ≥∑
h
(dm,h − Em,h) ⊥ pm ≥ 0
∀ m ∈ M \ FM. (3.23)
The zero profit conditions (3.22) are complementary to non-negative activity
levels xj.9 If a particular zero profit condition holds as an equality, the as-
sociated activity level is allowed to be strictly positive. If it holds as a strict
inequality, the associated activity level is zero. Market clearing conditions (3.23)
are complementary to non-negative prices pm. If supply of a certain good or
factor equals its demand, the associated price is allowed to be strictly positive.
If there exists excess supply, the associated price is zero. Thus, in principle it is
9 The ⊥ symbol is used as a mathematical shorthand for expressing complementarity, meaning
that not both inequalities can be strict.
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possible that a firm runs out of business because it does not break-even and
that a good is for free because there is excess supply of it. However, it does
not happen in our model analysis. Finally, households are supposed to have a
balanced budget with associated unknown utility level uh according to (3.14),
(3.17), and (3.18).
The system of simultaneous equations described above represents a static
framework which does not allow for true neoclassical modeling of e.g. saving
and investment which would be dynamic by nature. Therefore, we have to
choose how we close our model with regard to decision variables that are not
strictly determined by the static framework above. These so-called closure rules
are presented in Section 3.3.2. Moreover, we relax one of the market clearing
assumptions in (3.23) in order to allow for a more realistic market imperfection
in the form of unemployment in the labor market.
3.3.1 Labor market
In the basic model presented so far, we assumed a perfectly competitive labor
market which is cleared by a fully flexible wage. Of course, this is a very
unrealistic representation of the regional labor market. In 2014, S-H had an
unemployment rate of 6.8%. Therefore, we account for unemployment by
introducing the so-called wage curve of Blanchflower and Oswald (1995b) into
the model. For advantages of implementing the wage curve approach into
a CGE model compared to other models of wage rigidity such as efficient
bargaining (McDonald and Solow, 1981) or search and matching (Pissarides,
1984), we refer to Korzhenevych (2010). The wage curve describes a negative
relationship between the real wage and the unemployment rate. As shown in
Figure 3.7, the expansion of renewables leads to an increase in labor demand.
The new labor market equilibrium moves from point A to B, resulting in higher
employment but also a higher wage. In contrast to assuming a fixed wage
as in Bröcker et al. (2014, 2016), here only part of the adjustment is done by
employment. The rest of the adjustment is accomplished by an increase in the
wage level. Thus, we assume that both employment and the wage respond to
the external shock such that the renewables expansion will potentially lead to
much lower employment effects compared to the equilibrium point C in the
case of a fixed wage.
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Figure 3.7: Labour market response of the renewables expansion
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The wage curve is given by
pl
Π
= ϑqζ , (3.24)
where the wage pl is corrected by the local CPI to obtain the real wage, ϑ is a
position parameter, q is the unemployment rate, and ζ is the unemployment
elasticity of wages. The latter shows by which percentage the real wage changes
due to a 1% increase in the unemployment rate. The labor market clearing
condition is now given by
S¯l (1− q) =∑
j
xjal,j. (3.25)
The labor supply in the case of full employment is denoted by S¯l. It is obtained
from the benchmark data as S¯l = ∑h E0l,h/(1− q0). The wage curve (3.24) is
calibrated with benchmark unemployment rate q0 = 0.068 from Statistik der
Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2017a), price level Π0 = ∑h pi0h = ∑h Vˆh from the
benchmark use table, benchmark wage p0l = 1, and ζ = −0.1 from Blanchflower
and Oswald (1995a).
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3.3.2 Model closures
The general equilibrium model developed in the course of this paper only
provides a snapshot view of the economy of S-H. It is based on standard
neoclassical microeconomics where e.g. households maximize their utility at
a given point in time, here the year 2014. The effects of an external shock to
the economy is then evaluated by comparative statics. Therefore, we have to
make assumptions on parts of the economy which would usually be modeled
in a dynamic framework. These include saving and investment decisions of
households and fiscal policies of the local government which both would
include forward looking behaviour regarding e.g. risks and price expectations.
Since we do not model any intertemporal efficiency and equilibrium, we thus
define ad hoc adjustment rules for these otherwise dynamic economic behaviors
as follows.
The state of S-H is assumed to be a small open economy, which takes the
price for any good in the ROW as given. Therefore, we introduced only one
ROW price denoted by e¯. The local prices relative to this ROW price are then
determined endogenously by the system of simultaneous equations introduced
above. Thus, we assume that there does not exist any exchange rate mechanism
to influence the local price level. In fact, if all zero profit, market clearing
and budget constraints are fulfilled, the external balance of payments of the
small open economy of S-H is also fulfilled as per Walras’ law. The balance of
payments would include all net flows of funds appearing in the model, which
we denoted by Fh for all h ∈ H. For instance, the renewables expansion in S-H
leads to an improvement of the state’s current account since the additional
electricity is exported to the ROW. Thus, in order to attain a simultaneous
equilibrium on all markets, the local price level increases such that exports
become relatively more expensive and imports relatively cheaper vis-à-vis local
goods, which ensures the equilibrium of S-H’s balance of payments in our
modeling framework.
Regarding saving and investment, we assume that investors would like to
achieve certain investment goals in real terms. These investment goals are
represented by the utility level of the investment household v which we fix at
u¯v. In case of an external shock to the economy, the exogenous investment level
u¯v is maintained by an endogenous net flow of funds Fv from the ROW.
Regarding the state’s fiscal policy, we assume that the local government
debt and tax transfers remain constant. Recall that according to (3.18), the
local government consumption expenditures only depend on tax revenues
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that accrue to the state and municipalities after the vertical and horizontal tax
revenue distribution. The remainder are the government debt and tax revenue
transfers i.e. exogenous net flow of funds F¯g. The government’s budget balance
is attained by its unknown utility level ug. This means that any additional
local tax revenue due to the renewables expansion is used for government
consumption and not for e.g. the reduction of debt.
Further, we assume that saving and investment of private households remains
constant. Thus, similar to the local government, we assume the net flow of
funds F¯o and F¯w to be exogenous such that any additional income due to the
renewables expansion is spent for private consumption and not for savings or
other external flows with the ROW.
Finally, by letting the price for capital pk be endogenous according to (3.23),
we assume that capital is mobile across firms F, but immobile across regions
i.e. between S-H and the ROW. The underlying S-U tables of our static model
only show value flows and we have no information on the capital stock of S-H.
Therefore, we implicitly assume that the capital stock in S-H is fix and ‘jumps’
from one firm (or sector) to the other but not to or from the ROW.
It is important to note that the choice of closure rules is crucial for the
model results and especially welfare analysis. Suppose that we let the net flow
of funds of private households be endogenous. Then, part of the additional
income due to the expansion of renewables will be transferred to the ROW
instead of consumed locally such that households’ utility levels decrease. Thus,
an increase of lending to the ROW without taking into account future periods
would lead to a decrease in welfare in our static framework.
3.3.3 Solution and counterfactual equilibria
Given the equilibrium conditions (3.14), (3.17), (3.18), (3.22)-(3.23), and the
labor market clearing condition (3.25), we compute the reference equilibrium
in order to verify that all model equations hold and benchmark values are
being reproduced, if benchmark market prices p0m = 1 ∀ m ∈ M, activity levels
x0j = 1 ∀ j ∈ J, utility levels uh = 1 ∀ h ∈ H, and unemployment rate q0 = 0.069
are inserted. The system has 300 equations with corresponding unknowns.
In order to analyze the income and employment effects of the renewables
expansion in S-H, we need to define a policy scenario for comparing the
reference equilibrium with counterfactual equilibria. The static nature of the
model only allows for one-period shocks i.e. comparative statics. Therefore, in
the reference no additional renewable electricity is produced, whereas in the
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counterfactual equilibrium the government’s expansion plans for the year 2030
have been implemented.
The expansion plans are shown in the first columns of Table 3.3. In total,
renewable electricity production is supposed to be more than doubled until
2030. The major share with 88% of total renewable electricity production in 2030
will be produced by wind energy. Note that there is no need to account for the
already existing renewable electricity production since we are only interested
in the equilibrium effects of the expansion plans. The shock variables are the
exogenous activity levels x¯z ∀ z ∈ Z. In the reference equilibrium, the activity
levels are x¯z = 0 ∀ z ∈ Z such that there is no expansion. In the counterfactual
equilibria, the stipulated amount of renewable electricity in value terms for the
year 2030 from Table 3.3 is produced at activity levels x¯z = 1 ∀ z ∈ Z. Under the
feed-in scheme the values are given by the EEG compensations V¯0rele. Under the
tender scheme the values are given by the market values V0rele (cf. last columns of
Table 3.3).
Bröcker et al. (2014, 2016) differentiate between income and employment
effects during the construction and operation phase. Here, we merge the effects.
For instance, besides buying intermediate service and factor inputs for operating
the wind farms, renewable firm z = 140 buys 152 onshore wind turbines as
an additional intermediate input representing the yearly construction phase.
One can also think of it as the yearly depreciation of wind turbines. Cost and
revenue functions are calibrated with regional information on commodity-wise
input costs V0i,z and total input costs V
0
z from interviews in Bröcker et al. (2014,
2016) as well as with the feed-in compensation and market price data from
Table 3.3. Demand for intermediate and factor inputs due to the construction
and operation of new plants amount to 1.9bne. Revenues under the feed-in and
tender scheme are 2.6bne and 0.7bne, respectively.
3.4 simulation results
The main income results are summarized in Figure 3.8. Under the feed-in scheme
the renewables expansion leads to a 0.94% (or 715mne p.a.) higher regional
GDP from 2030 to as long as the plants operate. Thereof, the labor income effect
of factor l is 86mne p.a., the capital income effect of factor k is -19mne p.a.,
the profit income effect of renewable firms Z is 544mne p.a., the land rent
income effect is 72mne p.a., and the tax income effect (1− θ)Rg is 32mne p.a.
Note that the latter takes into account the German tax revenue sharing scheme.
The decrease in capital income indicates that the expansion shifts production
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from capital to more labor intensive firms. Since the lifetime of new plants
is hard to estimate and old plants are repowered constantly, we assume that
the expansion results are long-term income effects. Regarding the wage and
employment effects, the expansion leads to an increase of the wage by 0.2% and
creates 1,424 jobs. Further, total levies L to be paid by all households in Germany
due to the expansion in S-H are 1.93bne p.a., of which only 67mne p.a. are
paid by households in S-H. This corresponds to a levy for the additionally
produced renewable electricity of 7.6 Cent/KWh for households in Germany
and 0.3 Cent/KWh for households in S-H, respectively. Note that this levy is
only due to the expansion in S-H and does not indicate the overall levy to be
paid for all the renewable electricity in Germany.
The tender scheme leads to significantly smaller income effects because compe-
tition between renewable firms drives profits to zero. In total, GDP is only 0.15%
(or 139mne p.a.) higher from 2030 onwards. Thereof, the labor income effect of
factor l is 85mne p.a., the capital income effect of factor k is -24mne p.a., the
land rent income effect remains at 72mne p.a., and the tax income effect is only
6mne p.a. The decrease of the latter compared to the feed-in scheme is mainly
due to the loss of business tax income from profits. The wage and employment
effects are with an increase of the wage by 0.2% and 1,471 new jobs very similar
to the feed-in scheme. Recall that under the tender scheme levies are endogenous
such that renewable firms break even. Therefore, levies are lower compared to
the feed-in scheme in which guaranteed compensations are well above the lcoe.
They amount to 1.2bne p.a. to be paid by all households in Germany, of which
only 42mne p.a. are paid by households in S-H. This equals a levy for the
additionally produced renewable electricity of 4.7 Cent/KWh for households in
Germany and 0.2 Cent/KWh for households in S-H, respectively. Thus, levies
decrease by roughly one third due to the change in the compensating scheme.
Detailed sectoral results of both counterfactual equilibria are presented in
Figure 3.12 and following. Firm activities of ‘repair and installation of machin-
ery’, ‘manufacturers of electrical equipment’ and ‘research and development’
increase the most whereas of ‘manufacturers of other vehicles’, ‘shipping’ and
‘computer manufacturers’ decrease the most. Local prices pd for all d ∈ D and
pi for all i ∈ I only change marginally because S-H is small and fully integrated
into the world market. Thus, relatively little is traded internally and export and
import shares are high. All in all, the general equilibrium effects are small and
the main income effects result from feed-in compensations and land ownership.
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Finally, regarding the welfare effects of expanding renewables we calculate
the equivalent variations (EV) of households o, w and g as
EVh = e(pˆ0, uh)− e(pˆ0, u0h) ∀ h ∈ H \ {v}. (3.26)
The EVs indicate the monetary changes of benchmark income that households
would need in the reference equilibrium in order to obtain the post-shock utility
under benchmark prices pˆ0.
Under the feed-in scheme, the EVs are -47mne p.a. for the wind outsiders,
615mne p.a. for the wind insiders and 13mne p.a. for the local government.
This means that the wind outsiders are willing to pay 47mne p.a. in order
to avert the renewables expansion. In contrast, the wind insider and the local
government are willing to accept 615mne p.a. and 13mne p.a. if the renewables
expansion is not undertaken, respectively. Regarding the overall welfare effects
in S-H, we need to consider that the expansion leads to a change in the net
flow of investment funds Fv for household v due to the change in local prices
pi. Therefore, we obtain the overall welfare as
EV =∑
h
EVh − ∆Fv, (3.27)
where ∆Fv = Fv − F0v . The expansion of renewables leads to an inflow of
investment funds of ∆Fv =20mne p.a. The overall welfare increases by 560mne
p.a.
Under the tender scheme, the EVs are -21mne p.a. for the wind outsiders,
71mne p.a. for the wind insiders and -11mne p.a. for the local government.
The overall welfare increases by 20mne p.a.
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Figure 3.8: Income effects of renewables expansion in S-H
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3.4.1 Sensitivity analysis
In order to assess the robustness of the results, we check the sensitivity with
respect to different elasticities of substitution as well as the closure rule for the
capital mobility in S-H. In the following, we refrain from presenting sensitivity
results for the profit and land rent income effects because they remain stable
under all scenarios.
Since the economy of S-H is small compared to the ROW and trade data
for S-H is estimated by GRETA, the possibility of local firms to substitute
between local and foreign inputs can be one of the key mechanism that drives
the model results. Therefore, we check the sensitivity of results with respect to
the Armington trade elasticities σa from Table 3.2.
Figure 3.9 shows the income and employment results for varying σa by a
factor δ for all a ∈ A. For purposes of illustration, the x-axis shows the natural
logarithm of this factor where the left end indicates a factor δ very close to
zero i.e. assuming Leontief technology for all Armington firms and the right
end a very high factor i.e. nearly perfect substitutability. The results show
that the tax and capital income effects remain relatively stable under both
compensating schemes. Irrespective of the magnitude, this is an important
insight for regional policy makers who often promote the renewables expansion
with tax benefits for the municipalities in S-H. In contrast, the labor income
effect is more sensitive to trade elasticities and shows a negative relationship.
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Thus, the higher the trade elasticities are the lower is the labor income effect and
vice versa. In the extreme case of almost no substitution possibilities of firms
A between local and imported goods, the labor income effect is 216mne p.a.
(208mne p.a.) under the feed-in (tender) scheme compared to 86mne p.a. (85e
p.a.) in the baseline, respectively. The wage and employment results depicted
in the lower part of Figure 3.9 show the highest sensitivity with respect to trade
elasticities. They range from 3,070 (3,222) jobs for Armington elasticities close
to zero to only 570 (596) jobs for very high Armington elasticities under the
feed-in (tender) scheme.
Figure 3.9: Sensitivity of results with respect to different Armington elasticities, where
ln(δ) = ln(σa)/ ln(σ0a ) ∀ a ∈ A
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Besides Armington elasticities, we further check the sensitivity of income
results to changes in the input substitution elasticities σf ,klem of firms F in the
top level nest of Figure 3.3. The results depicted in Figure 3.10 show that income
and employment effects are not very sensitive to changes in the input elasticities
of firms.
Figure 3.10: Sensitivity of results with respect to different input elasticities, where
ln(δ) = ln(σf ,klem)/ ln(σ0f ,klem) ∀ f ∈ F
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As a last robustness check regarding elasticities, we compare the sensitivity of
results with respect to the unemployment elasticity of wages ζ. In their seminal
book (and paper), Blanchflower and Oswald (1995a,b) discover a statistical
regularity across countries, namely that ζ is very often close to -0.1. Hence,
if the unemployment rate doubles the wage falls by 10%. However, Kosfeld
and Dreger (2017b) argue that this ‘empirical law’ does not hold for more
recent multi-country as well as single-country studies which estimate ζ’s that
lie well below Blanchflower and Oswald’s popularized average value of -0.1. For
instance, Baltagi et al. (2012) and Kosfeld and Dreger (2017a) find a significantly
lower ζ of -0.025 and -0.037 for (West) Germany, respectively. This would
indicate a rather rigid labor market in which e.g. labor unions are able to
significantly influence the wage setting. Such lower values do not influence
the income effects but change the employment results significantly which is
shown in Figure 3.11. Given that we vary ζ from −1 to −0.01, we approximate
the corresponding natural logarithms by − ln(|ζ|) which is again shown on the
x-axis. The right end of the abscissa indicates an unemployment elasticity of
wages of ζ = −0.01 and the left end of ζ = −1. Thus, if the labor market of
S-H is becoming very rigid i.e. ζ = −0.01, the expansion leads to 6,785 (7,416)
new jobs under the feed-in (tender) scheme compared to 1,424 (1,471) jobs in the
baseline.
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Figure 3.11: Sensitivity of results with respect to different unemployment elasticities of
wages ζ.
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Finally, we check the sensitivity of results with respect to the capital mobility
in S-H. So far, we have assumed that capital is totally mobile across firms F
but immobile across regions i.e. between S-H and the ROW. In order to assess
whether the results change if capital is allowed to jump not only across firms
but also across regions, we fix the price of capital at p¯k = 1, thereby implicitly
endogenizing the capital stock. Then, a decrease in capital inputs of firms due
to the renewables expansion would indicate an increase of the capital stock
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financed by the ROW. In other words, if the return on capital in S-H is higher
than in the ROW due to the shock, the endogenous capital stock would jump
from the ROW to S-H. In fact, the shock leads to a decrease of capital inputs i.e.
jump of capital stock from the ROW to S-H by the amount of 437mne. For the
welfare analysis, it is important that we do not consider this jump of capital as
additional income of private households in S-H. Therefore, we keep the capital
income from factor k fix at E¯k,h ¯˜pk for h = o, w.
The results show that the tax income effect remains stable whereas the labor
income effect almost halves in case of higher capital mobility. Obviously, there
is no loss in income from factor k any more since endowments and the price are
both fixed. The tax income effect under the feed-in (tender) scheme is 31mne
p.a. (5mne p.a.) compared to 32mne p.a. (6mne p.a.) in the baseline. The
labor income effect decreases from 86mne p.a. (85mne p.a.) to 56mne p.a.
(46mnep.a.). The wage increases by 0.14% (0.12%) compared to 0.2% (0.2%) in
the baseline. Finally, the employment effect halves to only 774 (640) new jobs
compared to 1,424 (1,471) in the baseline.
3.4.2 Discussion
This paper provides certain methodological improvements to previous studies
on regional income and employment effects of renewables expansion such as
Hirschl et al. (2010, 2015, 2012), Ulrich et al. (2012), Bröcker et al. (2014, 2016),
and Többen (2017).
First, we take into account factor and output supply constraints. For instance,
the renewables expansion leads to an increase in labor demand by firms. While
previous studies assume that these additional workers are readily available at
the given wage, we assume that additional workers can only be mobilized by
paying a higher wage. Thus, we assume that labor supply is constrained and
represented by the upward-sloping wage curve discussed in Section 3.3.1. As
a consequence, only part of the adjustment to the additional labor demand
is done by employing additional workers while the rest of the adjustment is
accomplished by an increase in the wage. Hence, the unconstrained models
used in previous studies tend to exaggerate the size of the employment effects.
In fact, we find that the renewables expansion in S-H only leads to about half
as many new jobs compared to the results of Bröcker et al. (2014, 2016). Similar
arguments hold for the income effects since all other markets in our model are
supply-constrained as well.
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Secondly, we take into account the full response of price effects and substitu-
tion possibilities of firms and households. The renewables expansion changes
the relative prices of goods in S-H. Thus, households shift their consumption to
goods which become relatively cheaper, and firms shift their input composi-
tions accordingly. Similarly, firms shift their production output to goods which
become relatively more expensive. The degree of these shifts in the economy is
determined by various substitution elasticities (or transformation elasticities in
the case of outputs). The higher these elasticities, the more flexibly the economy
of S-H adjusts to the renewables expansion. This flexibility is usually not consid-
ered in previous studies because price effects are either disregarded in the first
place or the underlying models assume cost-determined prices independent
of demand. Although we find that the average price effects in S-H are rather
small, prices for certain goods and services such as underground construction
and transport equipment increase by up to 4 and 9%, respectively.
Thirdly, we take into account that part of the renewables expansion is paid by
private households in S-H according to the levy. This means that any additional
income is partly offset by an increase in levies. This is an improvement com-
pared to e.g. the studies of Bröcker et al. (2014, 2016). However, given that only
around 3.5% of the total levies are paid by citizens in S-H while the remainder
is paid by the rest of Germany, we find that these offsetting effects are rather
small. Or to put it bluntly, the income and employment effects for S-H are
mainly paid by the rest of Germany.
Finally, we take into account induced income effects. That is, the additional
income of households due to the renewables expansion leads to an increase in
local final consumption. Therefore, production is increased to satisfy the addi-
tional demand which in turn results in additional factor income for households
which again leads to an increase in local final consumption. Since we assume
that any additional income is entirely spent on local final consumption and not
partly on e.g. savings, we cover all these feedback effects in our welfare analysis
from Section 3.4.
3.5 conclusion
The objectives of this paper are twofold. First and foremost, to quantify the
income and employment effects of the renewable electricity expansion plans of
the state of S-H for the year 2030 by means of a static CGE model. Secondly,
to compare the income results of the old feed-in scheme with the new tender
scheme against the background of the future acceptance of renewable energies.
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Methodologically, the model is based on the national S-U tables of Germany for
2014 which allow for introducing multi-output firms into the model. The tables
are regionalized for S-H with a new non-survey regionalization technique that
explicitly accounts for geography in trade relationships. We follow a single-
region approach in which the state of S-H is trading goods with the large ROW,
whereby the ROW is not explicitly modeled. Renewable electricity producing
firms are modeled with survey information on regional component-wise input
costs and feed-in compensations. Compared to previous studies, the main
advantages of our CGE approach are the consideration of factor and supply
constraints of the economy, the full response of price effects and substitution
possibilities of firms and households, and induced income effects. Further, the
labor market allows for unemployment via the wage curve, and tax income
results take into account the German tax revenue sharing scheme such that we
present net income and employment effects of the renewables expansion.
The results suggest that net effects for S-H are rather limited. Income effects
result mainly from profits due to the stipulated compensations under the old
feed-in scheme. Labor and land rent income effects are considerably lower than
profits but remain stable under both schemes. We find that capital income
decreases after the renewables expansion. However, this is partly due to the fact
that we assume that capital is mobile across local firms but immobile between
S-H and the ROW. Further, the tax income effect is rather low because of the
German tax revenue scheme. Moreover, it is considerably higher under the
feed-in scheme due to business tax income of the municipalities.
Under the feed-in scheme, the local government’s expansion plans lead to a
0.94% (or 715mne p.a.) higher regional GDP from 2030 onwards. Thereof, the
income effect from renewables’ profit is 544mne p.a., the labor income effect is
86mne p.a., the land rent income effect is 72mne p.a., the tax income effect
is 32mne p.a. and the capital income effect is -19mne p.a. The expansion
increases the wage by 0.2% and creates 1,424 jobs which constitute 1.4% of all
100,957 unemployed persons in S-H in 2014. Competition among renewable
electricity producers under the tender scheme lowers income effects such that
the expansion leads only to a 0.15% (or 139mne p.a.) higher GDP. Thereof, the
labor income effect is 85mne p.a., the land rent income effect is 72mne p.a.,
the tax income effect is 6mne p.a., and the capital income effect is -24mne
p.a. Thus, profits and its associated tax income effects vanish which may in
fact result in lower acceptance of the renewables expansion. The wage and
employment effect is very similar to the feed-in scheme. Local firms that benefit
most from the expansion are in the field of ‘repair and installation of machin-
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ery’, ‘manufacturers of electrical equipment’ and ‘research and development’.
Moreover, the new tender scheme leads to a decrease of levies to be paid by
citizens of S-H for the additionally produced electricity by roughly two thirds.
The overall welfare in S-H indicated by the EV increases by 560mne p.a. under
the feed-in scheme and only 20mne p.a. under the tender scheme. Compared
to Bröcker et al. (2014, 2016) who estimated gross effects of the renewables
expansion in S-H, we find that the overall income and employment results are
roughly 50% lower if general equilibrium effects are taken into account.
Finally, we find that the profit, land ownership, and tax income effects remain
stable under different assumptions on substitution possibilities of firms. In
contrast, the labor income effect as well as wage and employment results
are quite sensitive to assumptions on the ability of S-H’s firms to substitute
between local and foreign inputs in their production process. The better firms
are able to substitute, the lower are the income and employment effects and vice
versa. Thus, if firms in S-H are not able to substitute between foreign and local
intermediate inputs, this might in fact have positive effects on labor income and
employment generated by the renewables expansion. Further, the employment
effects are very sensitive to assumptions on the level of rigidity of S-H’s labor
market. The more rigid i.e. bargaining power labor unions in S-H have, the
higher the employment effects and vice versa.
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a appendix to chapter 3
a.1 Substitution elasticities
Table 3.2: Substitution elasticities of firms F and A.
firm f σklem σkle σkl σene σen σmat firm a σa
Agriculture 0.78 5.23 0.34 0.10 0.00 1.00 Products of agriculture and hunting 3.08
Forestry and logging 0.78 5.23 0.34 0.10 0.00 1.00 Products of forestry and logging 2.50
Fishery 0.78 5.23 0.34 0.10 0.00 1.00 Fish 1.25
Mining and quarrying 0.27 0.54 1.28 0.10 0.00 1.00 Oil and gas 11.20
Manufacture of food, beverages and
tobacco
0.62 0.10 0.26 0.10 0.00 1.00 Mining and quarrying 0.90
Manufacture of textiles 0.63 0.12 0.42 0.10 0.00 1.00 Food products 3.21
Wood products 0.64 0.64 0.22 0.10 0.00 1.00 Beverages 1.15
Manufacture of paper and paper
products
0.68 0.36 0.23 0.10 0.00 1.00 Tobacco 1.15
Printing and media 0.68 0.36 0.23 0.10 0.00 1.00 Textiles 3.75
Manufacture of coke and refined
petroleum
0.31 7.86 0.31 0.10 0.00 1.00 Wearing apparel 3.70
Manufacture of chemicals products 0.77 1.15 0.52 0.10 0.00 1.00 Leather 4.05
Manufacture of pharmaceutical
products
0.77 1.15 0.52 0.10 0.00 1.00 Wood 3.40
Manufacture of rubber and plastic
products
0.56 0.17 0.22 0.10 0.00 1.00 Pulp and paper 2.95
Manufacture of other non-metallic
minerals
0.64 0.87 0.29 0.10 0.00 1.00 Pulp and paper products 2.95
Manufacture of basic metal 0.16 0.14 0.30 0.10 0.00 1.00 Printing and media 2.95
Manufacture of fabricated metal
products
0.16 0.14 0.30 0.10 0.00 1.00 Coke and refined petroleum
products
2.10
Manufacture of computer, electronic
and opticals
0.00 0.29 0.29 0.10 0.00 1.00 Chemical products 3.30
Manufacture of electrical equipment 0.00 0.29 0.29 0.10 0.00 1.00 Basic pharmaceuticals 3.30
Manufacture of machinery and
equipment
0.79 0.00 0.82 0.10 0.00 1.00 Rubber products 3.30
Manufacture of motor vehicles 0.53 0.32 0.58 0.10 0.00 1.00 Plastic products 3.30
Manufacture of other transport
equipment
0.53 0.32 0.58 0.10 0.00 1.00 Glass products 2.90
Manufacture of furniture and other
products
0.54 1.27 0.59 0.10 0.00 1.00 Ceramic and minerals 2.90
Repair and installation of machinery 0.68 0.21 0.20 0.10 0.00 1.00 Basic iron and steel 2.95
Other Energy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 1.00 Basic metals and other non-ferrous
metals
4.20
Trade margins 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 1.00 Casting of metals 4.20
Water supply 1.20 0.28 0.30 0.10 0.00 1.00 Metal products 3.75
Waste management 1.20 0.28 0.30 0.10 0.00 1.00 Computer and optical products 4.40
Constructions and construction
works
0.71 0.06 0.31 0.10 0.00 1.00 Electrical equipment 4.40
Land transport services 0.92 0.22 0.87 0.10 0.00 1.00 Machinery 4.05
Water transport 0.84 1.20 0.00 0.10 0.00 1.00 Motor vehicles 2.80
Air transport 0.97 0.28 0.82 0.10 0.00 1.00 Other transport equipment 2.80
Warehousing 0.71 0.70 0.36 0.10 0.00 1.00 Furniture 3.75
Postal services 1.17 0.03 2.72 0.10 0.00 1.00 Other manufacturing 3.75
Accommodation and food services 0.71 0.70 0.36 0.10 0.00 1.00 Repair and installation of machinery 1.90
Publishing services 1.17 0.03 2.72 0.10 0.00 1.00 Electricity 2.80
Media and broadcasting 1.17 0.03 2.72 0.10 0.00 1.00 Trade margins 1.90
Telecommunications 1.17 0.03 2.72 0.10 0.00 1.00 Water 2.80
Information services 1.17 0.03 2.72 0.10 0.00 1.00 Waste management services 2.80
Financial services 1.03 0.35 1.32 0.10 0.00 1.00 Waste and disposal services 3.75
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Insurance services and pension
funding
1.03 0.35 1.32 0.10 0.00 1.00 Other waste management services 3.75
Other financial and insurance
services
1.03 0.35 1.32 0.10 0.00 1.00 Building construction 1.90
Real estate services 1.33 0.25 0.39 0.10 0.00 1.00 Underground construction 1.90
Legal and accounting services 0.66 1.24 0.32 0.10 0.00 1.00 Other construction 1.90
Architectue and engineering services 0.66 1.24 0.32 0.10 0.00 1.00 Land transport services 1.90
Research and development 0.66 1.24 0.32 0.10 0.00 1.00 Water transport services 1.90
Advertising and market research
services
0.66 1.24 0.32 0.10 0.00 1.00 Air transport services 1.90
Other professional, scientific and
technical services
0.66 1.24 0.32 0.10 0.00 1.00 Warehousing 1.90
Rental and leasing services 0.66 1.24 0.32 0.10 0.00 1.00 Postal services 1.90
Employment services 0.66 1.24 0.32 0.10 0.00 1.00 Accommodation and food services 1.90
ravel agency, tour operator 0.66 1.24 0.32 0.10 0.00 1.00 Publishing services 1.90
Office and other business support
activities
0.66 1.24 0.32 0.10 0.00 1.00 Audiovisual and broadcasting
services
1.90
Public administration and defence 1.12 0.07 0.26 0.10 0.00 1.00 Telecommunications services 1.90
Education services 1.15 0.00 0.82 0.10 0.00 1.00 Information services 1.90
Human health services 0.97 0.93 0.43 0.10 0.00 1.00 Financial services 1.90
Social and residential care services 0.97 0.93 0.43 0.10 0.00 1.00 Insurance service and pension
fundings
1.90
Arts, culture and gambling 0.88 0.32 0.21 0.10 0.00 1.00 Other financial and insurance
services
1.90
Sports and recreation services 0.88 0.32 0.21 0.10 0.00 1.00 Real estate activity services 1.90
Services furnished by membership
organisations
0.88 0.32 0.21 0.10 0.00 1.00 Legal and accounting activities 1.90
Repair services of computers and
personal goods
0.88 0.32 0.21 0.10 0.00 1.00 Architecture and engineering
services
1.90
Other personal services 0.88 0.32 0.21 0.10 0.00 1.00 Research and development 1.90
Services of households 0.88 0.32 0.21 0.10 0.00 1.00 Advertising and market research 1.90
Other professional, scientific and
technical activities
1.90
Veterinary activities 1.90
Rental and leasing activities 1.90
Activities of employment placement
agencies
1.90
Travel agencies 1.90
Security and investigation activities 1.90
Public administration and defence 1.90
Compulsory social security service 1.90
Educational support activities 1.90
Human health activities 1.90
Residential care 1.90
Arts, culture, gambling and betting 1.90
Sports and recreation activities 1.90
Activities of membership
organisations
1.90
Repair of computers and household
goods
1.90
Other personal service activities 1.90
Goods and services of private
households
1.90
Source: Koesler and Schymura (2012), Aguiar et al. (2016) and own assumptions.
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a.2 Calibrated share form
In the benchmark situation, rearranging (3.2) to
αm,j = a0m,j
(
q0j
pˆ0m
)1−σj
(3.28)
and then inserting into (3.1) leads to the calibrated share form
cj(pˆ) =
(
∑
m
a0m,j
( qj0
pˆ0m
)−σj
pˆ
1−σj
m
) 1
1−σj
=
(
qo
−σj
j ∑
m
a0m,j pˆ
0
m
(
pˆm
pˆ0m
)1−σj) 11−σj
=
(
qo
1−σj
j ∑
m
a0m,j pˆ
0
m
q0j
(
pˆm
pˆ0m
)1−σj) 11−σj
= q0j
(
∑
m
v0m
(
pˆm
pˆ0m
)1−σj) 11−σj
(3.29)
with benchmark value input cost shares v0i = a
0
ij pˆ
0
i /q
0
j .
a.3 Input coefficients
Taking the derivative of (3.29) leads to input coefficients
am,j =
∂c(pˆ)
∂ pˆm
=
1
1− σj q
0
j
(
∑
m
a0m,j pˆ
0
m
q0j
(
pˆm
pˆ0m
)1−σj) σj1−σj a0m,j pˆ0m
q0j
pˆo
σj−1
m (1− σj) pˆ
−σj
m
= q0j
(
∑
m
a0m,j pˆ
0
m
q0j
(
pˆm
pˆ0m
)1−σj) σj1−σj a0m,j
q0j
(
pˆ0m
pˆm
)σj
= qo
1−σj
j q
σj
j
a0m,j
q0j
(
pˆ0m
pˆm
)σj
= a0m,j
(
qj/q0j
pˆm/ pˆ0m
)σj
. (3.30)
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a.4 Regional electricity market data
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Table 3.3: Renewable electricity market data and expansion targets of S-H
Source: Own representation based on data of Broecker.2012; Bröcker et al.
(2014) and MELUND (2016).
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a.5 Sectoral results
Figure 3.12: Change in output activity of a local firm x f
−60 −40 −20 0 20 40 60
Manufacture of other transport equipment
Water transport
Manufacture of electronic and optical products
Warehousing
Manufacture of pharmaceutical products
Employment services
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum
Wood products
Repair services of computers and personal goods
ravel agency, tour operator
Rental and leasing services
Trade margins
Land transport services
Manufacture of furniture and other products
Advertising and market research services
Manufacture of paper and paper products
Manufacture of chemicals products
Information services
Education services
Printing and media
Postal services
Forestry and logging
Waste management
Office and other business support activities
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
Air transport
Manufacture of basic metal
Public administration and defence
Human health services
Social and residential care services
Services furnished by membership organisations
Media and broadcasting
Sports and recreation services
Arts, culture and gambling
Accommodation and food services
Services of households
Publishing services
Telecommunications
Real estate services
Manufacture of machinery and equipment
Other personal services
Manufacture of motor vehicles
Manufacture of food, beverages and tobacco
Manufacture of textiles
Mining and quarrying
Other financial and insurance services
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
Other professional, scientific and technical services
Financial services
Agriculture
Constructions and construction works
Insurance services and pension funding
Energy supply
Architectue and engineering services
Legal and accounting services
Manufacture of fabricated metal products
Water supply
Fishery
Research and development
Manufacture of electrical equipment
Repair and installation of machinery
%-change
Tender scheme
Feed-in scheme
A appendix to chapter 3 97
Figure 3.13: Change in output activity of an Armington firm xa
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Figure 3.14: Change in local prices pd
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Figure 3.15: Change in commodity prices pi
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N AT I O N A L C L I M AT E P O L I C Y U N D E R T H E E U R O P E A N
U N I O N E M I S S I O N S T R A D I N G S Y S T E M
A previous version of this chapter has appeared as:
Burmeister, Johannes and Sonja Peterson (2016). National Climate Policies in
Times of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). Kiel
Working Paper 2052.
Abstract: Given the low carbon price in the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS)
in recent years while consensus about a more stringent EU climate policy is
very unlikely in the near future, we explore the potential scope and optimal
design of additional national climate policy in the current EU policy framework.
We suggest to implement a type of carbon price floor in the national EU ETS
sectors that allows for shifting emission targets to non-ETS sectors like housing
and transportation as well as retiring EU-wide emission allowances. By doing
so, countries are able to either i) achieve the same emission target at lower
abatement cost or ii) achieve a lower emission target at basically no extra cost.
In order to determine the empirical relevance of our policy suggestions, we
conduct a partial equilibrium analysis of the EU carbon market in 2020. We
find that Germany is able to either achieve the same emission target at 370mne
lower abatement cost or achieve a 11 Mt of CO2 lower emission target at no
extra costs by introducing a carbon price floor of 32e or 36e per ton in 2020,
respectively.
Keywords: Climate policy, EU Emissions Trading System, overlapping regula-
tion, carbon price floors, marginal abatement costs, partial equilibrium analysis
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4.1 introduction
This paper explores the potential scope and optimal design of national climate
policy in the European climate policy context. We argue that certain carbon
pricing policy designs have the potential to reconcile European Union (EU) and
national climate policy in an effective and cost-efficient manner.
Already in the Kyoto Protocol from 1997, the EU member states made use
of the provision to fulfill their greenhouse gas (GHG) emission commitments
jointly. They agreed on a collective target to reduce emissions in the first
commitment period of the Protocol from 2008-2012 to 8% below 1990 levels.
Also for the post-Kyoto climate policy, the EU intends to fulfill its emission
reduction targets jointly. One of the three main targets of the EU Climate and
Energy Package adopted in 2009 is to cut GHG emissions by 20% compared
to 1990 levels by the year 2020 (European Commission, 2008). Economists
appreciate such a joint target since it opens the way to implement an EU-wide
climate policy that aims at reaching this target at minimum costs.
A cornerstone of EU climate policy to reach the joint target is the EU Emis-
sions Trading System (EU ETS) launched in 2005. It covers more than 11,000
power stations and industrial plants in 31 countries, as well as airlines. In
principle, the EU ETS ensures cost efficiency because due to trading of emission
allowances marginal abatement costs across sources equalize and thereby the
exogenous joint emissions target (the so-called ‘cap’) is reached at minimum
costs.
Yet, the system produces large inefficiencies since the EU ETS only covers
about half of the EU’s GHG emissions. For the remaining emissions in non-ETS
sectors such as housing, agriculture and transportation, EU countries agreed
to undertake individual measures to reach binding national annual targets
until 2020 under the ‘Effort Sharing Decision’ (European Commission, 2009).
Therefore, the current EU carbon market already represents a second best
solution (Böhringer et al., 2006; Böhringer et al., 2016). Böhringer et al. (2009)
analyze the resulting inefficiencies in the year 2020 with three computable
general equilibrium (CGE) models. They show that the inefficiencies of the
partitioned EU carbon market, with one EU Emission Allowance (EUA) price
and 28 implicit non-ETS prices in each member state, can be significant and
leading to 25-50% higher abatement costs compared to the efficient solution.1
1 In reality, inefficiencies are potentially even larger since the multitude of national policy
measures outside the EU ETS do not ensure an equalization of marginal abatement costs in the
non-ETS sectors in each country as in the models used in Böhringer et al. (2009).
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One reform proposal for the EU ETS is thus to extend its scope to more
sectors and regions (Böhringer et al., 2014; Edenhofer et al., 2014). It would
be beneficial if there was only one carbon price in the EU in the long-run and
an overall coherent European climate policy. Moreover, the hitherto political
EU ETS targets have not been very ambitious and lead to a large surplus of
around 1.5 billion EUAs at the end of 2017 (Graichen and Matthes, 2018). The
corresponding low EUA price of only around 5e per ton of CO2 in recent years
thus gave little incentive for technological development and structural change
required to achieve the long-term targets. Therefore, the latest EU ETS reform
includes an increase of the reduction rate of the emissions cap from 1.74% to
2.2% p.a. from 2021 onwards as well as the establishment of a so-called ‘market
stability reserve’ (MSR). The MSR is a quantity-based adjustment mechanism
of the annual auction volumes of allowances which aims to tackle the structural
surplus problem (European Commission, 2015, 2018a). However, it is doubtful
whether the MSR is the right policy measure to resolve this problem (Edenhofer
et al., 2014; Hepburn et al., 2016; Holt and Shobe, 2016; Perino and Willner,
2016).
This is why a number of countries that regard EU policies as insufficient are
discussing or implementing additional national measures to reduce emissions
in sectors that are already covered by the EU ETS. Examples are the UK carbon
price floor and several national carbon taxes (e.g. in Sweden, Finland and
Denmark). In 2016, also France announced the introduction of a price floor
of 30e per ton from 2019 on (The Guardian, 2016). Germany discussed an
additional climate levy for power stations (BMWi, 2015).
The general problem of these additional policies is that they are i) not effective
in terms of additional emissions reduction because with an unchanged amount
of allowances any national reductions within the EU ETS are offset elsewhere
and ii) not cost-efficient since they drive further wedges between carbon prices.
In this context, Böhringer et al. (2008) and Heindl et al. (2014) show that an
additional national carbon tax in the ETS sector in one or more countries further
increase EU-wide inefficiencies. Both papers impose a tax on top of the EUA
price in one region, which is equivalent to a price floor in the ETS sector, while
keeping the joint target constant. On the one hand, the higher carbon price
in the taxing region leads to an increase of overall abatement costs. On the
other hand, firms in the taxing region emit less and sell their excess allowances,
resulting in a fall of the EUA price. This leads to a decrease of overall abatement
costs in the EU ETS because non-taxing regions face a lower price and abate less
emissions. Böhringer et al. (2008) and Heindl et al. (2014) find that the net effect
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is always an increase in overall abatement costs and thus higher inefficiencies.
The non-ETS sector is disregarded because it is not affected by the policy in the
ETS sector.
As a result, the only way to increase abatement efforts by single, ambitious
EU countries seems to be to reduce more emissions in their non-ETS sectors that
are not linked to the EU ETS. The question is whether there are no advisable
possibilities to pursue more ambitious national climate policy in their ETS
sectors. Motivated by the idea of the German climate levy proposal that included
retiring EUAs as well as the general potential of additional policies to close
the gap between implicit non-ETS carbon prices and the EUA price, our paper
discusses two new policy options. These account for the possibility to shift
emission targets between ETS and non-ETS sectors as well as to retire EUAs
into the MSR and thereby reducing overall EU emissions. Therefore, we show
that national climate policy – although interfering with the EU ETS – can be
effective and cost-efficient.
This paper builds on the work by Böhringer et al. (2008) and Heindl et al.
(2014) but adds two alternative carbon pricing policy options, thereby contra-
dicting previous efficiency results. The general idea to allow for the adjustment
of emission targets in either the ETS or non-ETS sector as motivated above is
similar as in Abrell and Rausch (2016). But while Abrell and Rausch (2016)
take the perspective of a social planner for the EU which would again require
unanimous approval by all member states for any additional measures, we take
a national perspective. Our paper is also linked to the extensive literature on
price versus quantity constraints in emissions regulation and the combination
of both i.e. so-called hybrid approaches to carbon pricing such as price floors
within an ETS (e.g. Abrell and Rausch, 2017; Brink et al., 2016; Mandell, 2008;
Roberts and Spence, 1976; Unold and Requate, 2001; Weitzman, 1974; Wood
and Jotzo, 2011).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, we revisit the
Germany climate levy proposal from 2015 which – compared to e.g. existing
price floors – showed the potential to reconcile EU and national climate policy
(Peterson, 2015). In Section 4.3, we set up the stylized theoretical framework of
a simple one-country, two-sector model in order to derive the optimal design of
our two new policy options analytically. In Section 4.4, we test our theoretical
findings empirically and conduct a numerical partial equilibrium analysis of
the EU carbon market in 2020. After discussing the validity of our empirical
findings for the EU, we summarize our results and conclude.
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4.2 policy context
In December 2014, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and
Energy (BMWi) had set up a task force and agreed on a ‘Climate Action
Programme 2020’ (BMU, 2014) because it was likely to miss the national target
to reduce GHG emissions by 40% relative to 1990 until the year 2020. As
part of the programme, the BMWi identified the electricity sector as the one
with the highest potential to reduce emissions with a gap of at least 22 Mt of
CO2 emissions until the year 2020. In order to close this gap, the task force
recommended to introduce a carbon pricing option that is consistent with the
EU ETS framework in particular. The resulting climate levy proposal stipulated
that power stations have to submit a certain amount of additional EUAs for
emissions beyond a pre-defined free emission level. These additional ‘penalty
allowances’ would then have been signed over to the government and retired.
The free emission levels were designed such that especially old coal-fired power
stations would have been affected by the levy. In order to reach the emission
target for the power sector, it was estimated that the additional allowances will
result in extra costs of 18-20e per ton of CO2 in 2020.
In general, the proposal was very promising because besides accelerating the
fossil-fuel phase-out, the policy would have been effective due to the retirement
of EUAs. How many EUAs would have been actually retired is not clear though.
Only by chance, the EU emission reductions would have been equal to the
German ones. Peterson (2015) showed that they can be either higher or lower
depending on the free emission level compared to the hypothetical emission
level of the German power sector without the policy, the development of the
EUA price, and the implicit level of the levy.
Therefore, the effectiveness of the climate levy to reach the national targets
depends – as with all price based instruments – on estimates of the marginal
abatement cost curves (MACCs). From the perspective of an individual power
station, the MACC indicates either the marginal loss in profits from avoiding
the last unit of emissions or the marginal cost of achieving a certain emission
target given some level of output (Klepper and Peterson, 2006). If targets are
not reached, it would be necessary to readjust the specifics of the levy. Similarly,
also the cost efficiency depends on the design of the free emission level and it
is not guaranteed that marginal abatement costs equalize across German power
stations which is the condition for cost efficiency. Thus, it is not guaranteed that
the emission reductions within the power sector are taking place where they
are cheapest.
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Given these uncertainties, it would be better to implement a true national
price floor for all emitters in the ETS sectors as suggested by Edenhofer and
Schmidt (2018), among many others. That is, all emitters need to pay a levy
as the difference between the current EUA price and the stipulated price floor.
The revenues can then be used to retire EUAs.
Although the proposal has been dismissed in mid 2015 due to strong resis-
tance from the coal lobby, the latest reform of the EU ETS from 2017 adopts
the idea of retiring EUAs within the establishment of the MSR. The MSR is a
quantity mechanism designed to adjust the short-term auction supply of EUAs
by establishing a reserve of non-auctioned EUAs. The long-term emissions cap
is not affected by the MSR. Most importantly, within the MSR it is also possible
to retire EUAs if power stations shut down due to national policy measures
(cf. BMU, 2018, p. 4). In addition to retiring EUAs, Germany is supposed to
buy additional EUAs from other member states for missing its non-ETS targets
especially in the transportation and agriculture sector (Tutt, 2018). In general,
this implicitly allows for the possibility to shift emission targets between ETS
and non-ETS sectors. Given both these possibilities, we show that additional
national climate policy can be effective as well as cost-efficient and suggest
that policymakers hedge against differences in marginal abatement costs across
non-ETS and ETS sectors. This can either be done by following a cost or an
environmental optimization behavior which we show in the following simple
one-country, two-sector model.
4.3 theoretical analysis
We use a simple partial equilibrium framework for one country in order to
evaluate the effectiveness and cost efficiency of additional national carbon
pricing. The country has to abate emissions in two sectors. One sector is
regulated by an ETS with a fixed overall joint target for potentially i = 1, ..., I
countries (ETS sector). The other sector is regulated by an individual carbon
tax in order to meet a fixed national target (non-ETS sector).
The country has emission abatement possibilities associated with certain
costs that can be represented by a cost function c(a) with a being the abated
emissions quantity (e.g. Mt of CO2). The cost function is assumed to be strictly
monotonically increasing and convex, i.e. c′(a) > 0 and c′′(a) > 0. We denote
c(x) and q(y) as the cost functions in the ETS and non-ETS sector with actual
abated emission quantities x and y, respectively. Within the joint target of the
ETS sector, the country of interest can trade emission allowances with other
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countries as needed because its actual abatement x may be either greater or
less than ex-ante allocated or auctioned quantities depending on its abatement
possibilities. Cost efficiency for the ETS sector is characterized by the cost-
minimizing allocation of abatement between the country of interest and all
other countries, which are not explicitly modeled here. Therefore, we denote x˜
as the equilibrium abatement quantity with respective allowance price ρ that
equalizes marginal abatement costs across all countries.
Regarding the non-ETS sector, there does not exist a joint target but only a
national target. For simplicity, we follow Böhringer et al. (2016) and assume that
this individual target is met by a national carbon tax pi = q′(y). Therefore, the
carbon market is characterized by a second best solution with two potentially
different carbon prices ρ and pi. This second best solution reflects, in a simplified
manner, the situation of a single country in the current EU carbon market. Of
course, while in the EU market there also exist only one EUA price, there exist
many potentially different (shadow) prices outside the ETS in the 28 member
states and their various non-ETS sectors. The general setting is summarized
in Figure 4.1 where the functional form of the MACCs is chosen arbitrarily.
Empirically, one expects higher costs for the same abatement quantity in the
non-ETS sector because it represents sectors like transportation or housing
where it is more costly to abate emissions. Thus, the non-ETS MACCs are
typically left to the ETS ones. However, this does not necessarily have to be the
case as we will discuss in Section 4.4.
Figure 4.1: Marginal abatement cost curves in the one-country, two-sector model
Abatement
Price
q′(y) c′(x)
ρ
pi
y x˜
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4.3.1 The climate levy
First, we revisit the German climate levy proposal. In contrast to the original
proposal, we assume that the government introduces a true national carbon
price floor. That is, the government introduces a quantity tax (or levy) on top
of the allowance price for all emitters in the ETS sector instead of only for
certain emitters in the power sector. If translated into our partial equilibrium
framework, the country increases its abatement effort in the ETS sector due
to the national price floor. Normally, this would lead to a falling allowance
price ρ and higher emissions in other countries covered by the ETS i.e. to a
counter-effect and overall unchanged ETS emissions since the overall ETS target
remains the same. However, as stipulated in the proposal, we assume that the
government buys the excess allowances and retires them. This means that other
countries are not affected by the policy measure in the country of interest. The
climate levy policy option, in the following denoted by the superscript `, is
depicted in Figure 4.2 below.
In the benchmark situation, denoted by the superscript o, the country abates
quantities x˜o and yo at allowance price ρo and tax pio, respectively. Let C(x, y) =
c(x) + q(y) denote the aggregated cost function. It follows that the total national
abatement costs in the benchmark situation are C(x˜o, yo) = c(x˜o) + q(yo) = Co.
The introduction of a tax τ` on top of the benchmark allowance price ρo is
equivalent to introducing a national price floor ρ` = ρo + τ`, which results in
the increased abatement level x`.
Figure 4.2: Effectiveness of the German climate levy proposal
Abatement
Price
q′(y) c′(x)
ρo
τ`{
pio
ρ`
yo x˜o x`
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On the one hand, the retiring of allowances makes the policy effective such
that national as well as overall emissions decrease. On the other hand, the addi-
tional abatement effort increases costs by the gray shaded area in Figure 4.2.
The new emission target is simply met at higher costs. Since we are not able to
directly measure the environmental benefits of the additionally averted pollu-
tion, the cost efficiency of the German climate levy cannot be easily compared
with the benchmark situation because both costs and benefits increase. However,
the proposal does not follow any optimization behavior and we suspect it to
drive further wedges between carbon prices, thereby increasing inefficiencies of
the carbon market. Therefore, we rather suggest national policymakers to use
the possibility of shifting abatement efforts between sectors in order to hedge
against the differences in marginal abatement costs of the non-ETS and ETS
sector as follows.
4.3.2 Cost optimization
Given the possibility to shift emission targets, we suggest policymakers to
introduce a carbon price floor that optimizes national cost efficiency. That is,
the country shifts its abatement effort between the ETS and non-ETS sector
such that the benchmark emission target is attained at lower total abatement
costs. As before, the excess allowances resulting from the policy measure in the
country of interest are retired such that other countries covered by the ETS are
again unaffected. The national optimization problem is given by
min
x,y
c(x) + q(y)
s.t. x + y = z.
(4.1)
To simplify notation, we define the emission target as an abatement target
denoted by z. That is, if e is the overall national emission target and eB is some
business-as-usual emission level, the abatement target is z := eB − e.
Obviously, the optimum is characterized by the first order conditions that
marginal abatement costs equalize across both sectors. Under the national
policy option cost optimization, in the following denoted by the superscript κ,
the optimal abatement quantities xκ and yκ solve (4.1) for the case that the
national benchmark abatement target zo = x˜o + yo is attained, i.e. xκ, yκ =
arg min (c(x) + q(y)) for z = zo. This results in lower total abatement costs
C(xκ, yκ) = Cκ compared to the benchmark level Co. The policy option is also
depicted in Figure 4.3 below. The dark gray shaded area are the additional costs
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in the ETS sector and the light gray shaded area are the reduced costs in the
non-ETS sector, respectively. The difference is the lowest at the cost-efficient,
optimal national price floor
ρκ = c′(xκ) = q′(yκ). (4.2)
Thus, since xκ + yκ = zo, this policy option is environmentally not effective but
improves national as well as overall cost efficiency of the carbon market.
Figure 4.3: Cost efficiency of climate policy under national cost optimization
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q′(y) c′(x)
ρo
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yo x˜o xκyκ
Assuming simple linear MACCs of the form c′(x) = ax and q′(y) = by with
slope parameters a and b, it is possible to derive a closed form solution x∗, y∗
of the optimal national price floor level that can also be easily interpreted. It is
obvious from (4.1) and (4.2) that in the optimum x∗/y∗ = b/a and x∗ + y∗ = z.
Rearranging the former and plugging into the latter leads to optimal quantities
x∗ = b
a + b
z
and
y∗ = a
a + b
z
for any national target z > 0. Thus, the optimal total abatement costs can be
formulated as a function of the abatement target only, namely
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2
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a + b
z
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+
b
2
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z
)2
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1
2
z2
(a + b)2
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)
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2
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.
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(4.3)
That is, the total abatement costs are proportional to the square of the abatement
target. For instance, if the abatement target doubles, the costs quadruple.
In the benchmark situation, it holds that ρo = ax˜o, pio = byo and zo = x˜o +
yo = ρo/a + pio/b. Thus, the optimal national price floor under cost optimization
is given by
ρκ = axκ =
ab
a + b
zo =
b
a + b
ρo +
a
a + b
pio. (4.4)
It is a weighted average of the old benchmark prices in the country of interest,
where the benchmark ETS and non-ETS price is weighted by the marginal cost
parameter of the non-ETS and ETS sector, respectively.
4.3.3 Environmental optimization
Instead of optimizing national cost efficiency, policymakers might want to intro-
duce a carbon price floor that optimizes national environmental effectiveness.
That is, the country shifts its abatement effort between the ETS and non-ETS
sector such that the national benchmark costs are attained at a higher abatement
target. The national optimization problem is now given by
max
x,y
x + y
s.t. c(x) + q(y) = C.
(4.5)
Thus, under the national policy option environmental optimization, in the fol-
lowing denoted by the superscript u, the optimal abatement quantities xu and
yu solve (4.5) for the case that the national benchmark abatement costs Co
are attained, i.e. xu, yu = arg max (x + y) for C = Co. This results in a higher
abatement target zu compared to the benchmark level zo.
The policy option is also depicted in Figure 4.4 below. The additional costs in
the ETS sector (the dark gray shaded area) equals the reduced costs in the non-
ETS sector (the light gray shaded area). The overall abatement quantity increases
from x˜o + yo = zo to xu + yu = zu. Therefore, compared to the previous policy
option, the optimal national price floor is higher, i.e. ρu > ρκ. The difference
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between the new and old target quantity i.e. environmental effectiveness is the
highest at the optimal national price floor
ρu = c′(xu) = q′(yu). (4.6)
Figure 4.4: Effectiveness of climate policy under national environmental optimization
Abatement
Price
q′(y) c′(x)
ρo
pio
ρu = piu
yo x˜o xuyu
Assuming simple linear MACCs as before, it is possible to derive a closed
form solution of the optimal price floor which is again a weighted average of
the old benchmark prices. Given (4.3) and
Co =
1
2
x˜o2 +
1
2
yo2 =
1
2
(
ρo2
a
+
pio2
b
)
,
solving C∗(zu) != Co for zu leads to
zu =
√
(a + b)
(
ρo2/a + pio2/b
)
ab
.
Thus, the optimal national price floor level under environmental optimization is
given by
ρu = axu =
ab
a + b
zu =
√
ab
a + b
(
ρo2
a
+
pio2
b
)
. (4.7)
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4.4 empirical analysis
We now extend our stylized one-country, two-sector model and conduct a
numerical partial equilibrium analysis of the EU carbon market. The question
is whether it is cost-efficient and effective if a certain EU country introduces a
national price floor in the ETS sector. In order to do so, we need estimates of the
MACCs for each of the 28 EU countries as well as Norway, Liechtenstein and
Iceland, who also participate in the EU ETS. To this end, we follow Ellerman
and Decaux (1998), Klepper and Peterson (2006) and Böhringer et al. (2008),
among others, and obtain a sequence of carbon price and abatement quantity
combinations from a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model solution for
the year 2020. A brief description of the CGE model and its calibration to the
actual EU emission reduction targets for 2020 is presented in the next section.
After approximating the MACCs by least squares, we are able to evaluate the
policy options from Section 4.3 empirically.
4.4.1 Generation of marginal abatement cost curves
In order to approximate the MACCs in the ETS and non-ETS sectors for each
country that participates in the EU ETS, we generate a sequence of carbon
price and emission level combinations from the Dynamic Applied Regional
Trade (DART) model. DART is a multi-region, multi-sector recursive dynamic
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the world economy including
21 EU regions (see Table 4.1 below).2 The EU regions include all major EU
countries as well as two aggregations of countries, namely the Baltic States and
the Rest of the EU3. The economy in each region is modeled as a competitive
economy with flexible prices and market clearing. All regions are connected
through bilateral trade flows. The model is calibrated to the GTAP8 database,
which includes production, trade as well as CO2 emissions data for the base
year 2007 (The Global Trade Analysis Project, 2012). The major exogenous
drivers of the dynamic structure are the GDP projections, the savings rate, the
depreciation rate, and the rate of change of the population. For each year and
region, the representative agent’s labor productivity is adjusted such that the
2 For a detailed description of the DART model see Weitzel et al. (2012) and Weitzel (2010).
3 The Rest of the EU includes Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus, Luxemburg,
Liechtenstein and Iceland. Besides the 21 EU regions, the rest of world is aggregated to nine
regions: North America, Latin America, India, China, Former Soviet Union, Pacific Asia, Middle
East and Northern Africa, Subsaharan Africa and Rest of Annex B countries.
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exogenous GDP path (OECD, 2014) is reached. The model horizon here is the
year 2020.
The GTAP data for sectoral CO2 emissions of fossil fuels resulting from final
demand and intermediate input demand is linked to the consumption and
production structure of DART. In a CGE model, the marginal abatement cost is
defined as the shadow cost that is produced by a quantity constraint on CO2
emissions for a given region and a given time. It is equal to the tax that would
have to be levied on the emissions to achieve the targeted level or the price of
an emission allowance in the case of emissions trading (Klepper and Peterson,
2006). This price is plotted against a corresponding abatement quantity, which
is the difference in emissions levels between an unconstrained business-as-usual
reference scenario and a constrained policy scenario. Here, for the EU regions,
the policy scenario is characterized by emission constraints for the ETS and
non-ETS sectors according to the EU’s ETS cap and Effort Sharing Decision,
respectively. For the rest of world regions, we assume that countries fulfill their
emission targets stated in the ‘Copenhagen Agreement’ from 2012.
In general, there are two possibilities to generate individual MACCs. First, to
generate the MACC of a particular country by varying its emission constraints
while the rest of world does nothing regarding the abatement of emissions.
Second, to generate the MACC of a particular country while the rest of world
also undertakes abatement policies. Here, we follow the second approach and
vary the constraints for each of the 21 EU regions in 2020 simultaneously
while the rest of world emissions are constrained according to the Copenhagen
pledges. Therefore, the national MACCs are not independent from one another
since the marginal abatement cost in one country is affected by emission
constraints in other countries via e.g. world energy prices as discussed in
Klepper and Peterson (2006) and Morris et al. (2012). That is, when also policies
in other countries are considered, energy prices fall which leads to higher
emissions in the country of interest (absent its own policy). Therefore, it becomes
more expensive to reach the same emission target and the MACC is shifted
upwards in order to represent other countries’ undertaken policies. Thus, by
simultaneously varying the quantity constraints across countries and sectors as
well as considering the constraints in the rest of world regions, the resulting
MACCs are likely to have an intercept with the y-axis. As a result, the business-
as-usual reference assumed here does not correspond to a reference scenario in
which an abatement quantity of zero results in no marginal cost as it is assumed
in the stylized model of Section 4.3.
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Therefore, we assume non-linear MACCs of the form
ρ = c′i(xi) = αix
3
i + βix
2
i + γixi + δi (4.8)
and
pii = q′i(yi) = ζiy
3
i + ηiy
2
i + θiyi + µi (4.9)
for i = 1, ..., 21 EU regions. Since the underlying GTAP data is in million US
dollars, we convert the CO2 prices with an exchange rate given by the GDP
forecast in million Euro for the EU in 2020 from the European Commission
(2018b) divided by the GDP in million US dollars of the DART model in 2020.
The resulting exchange rate is 1$=0.79e. Inserting the sequence of abatement
quantities x˜i and yi in Mt and respective prices ρ and pii in e per ton into
(4.8) and (4.9), we fit the MACCs by least-squares to obtain estimates for the
parameters αˆi to µˆi.
The fit of the OLS regression for selected EU regions is shown in Figure 4.5
below, where the dotted curves are absolute abatement levels obtained from
the CGE model and the solid curves are the respective OLS fits. As assumed
in Section 4.3, it is generally cheaper to abate emissions in the ETS than in the
non-ETS sector. In this respect, France is an exception mainly because of its
high share of nuclear power generation within the ETS sector.
Figure 4.5: OLS fit of non-linear marginal abatement cost curves for the ETS and
non-ETS sector in selected EU countries
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(b) France
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(e) Spain
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(f) Italy
Moreover, marginal abatement costs also differ across the different ETS
and non-ETS sectors. Figure 4.7, Appendix A.1 shows selected MACCs of
different sectors in Germany, France and the UK. In order to account for sector
size, the x-axis shows the percentage abatement relative to the business-as-
usual emissions in 2020. For all three countries, the electricity sector shows
the cheapest abatement possibilities within the ETS sectors. The refined oil
production sector shows the most expensive abatement possibilities within the
ETS sectors in Germany and the UK. In France, abatement is the most expensive
in the chemical sector. Within the non-ETS sectors, the coal mining sector shows
the cheapest abatement possibilities in Germany and the UK. In France, it is the
cheapest to abate emissions in the natural gas extraction sector. For all three
countries, it is the most expensive to abate emissions in the mobility sector.
4.4.2 Analysis of the EU carbon market
We begin by calculating the EU ETS and non-ETS abatement targets for the
year 2020 as follows. Table 4.1 summarizes the EU carbon market data based
on the GTAP emissions in the DART model. The first column shows the
baseline emissions in the year 2007. By running the DART model without
any emission constraints until the year 2020, we obtain the business-as-usual
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emissions (second column). The major difference between the second (2008-2012)
and third (2013-2020) phase of the EU ETS is the change from grandfathered
national emission caps to an EU-wide cap. Therefore, in order to obtain the
emission target of the ETS sector in the year 2020, we apply the country-specific
allocation factors according to the National Allocation Plans for the second
phase (European Commission, 2007), whereas for 2013-2020 we apply a yearly
relative reduction of 1.74% p.a. for each EU region as envisaged by phase 3 of
the EU ETS in order to obtain the EU-wide cap. Regarding the non-ETS sector,
national emission targets are given by the Effort Sharing Decision (European
Commission, 2009), which implies a reduction of 1.95% p.a. from 2013 to 2020
for each EU member country. The business-as-usual emissions less the emission
targets then lead to abatement targets for the year 2020. The last column shows
the resulting EU-wide emission reductions for the ETS and non-ETS sector in
2020 with 27% and 13% lower emission levels compared to 2007, respectively.
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Table 4.1: EU emissions data and resulting abatement target for the year 2020
Emissions
in 2007 (Mt
CO2)
Business-
as-usual
emissions
in 2020 (Mt
CO2)
Emission
target in
2020 (Mt
CO2)
Abatement
target in
2020 (Mt
CO2)
Reduction
factor: 2020
to 2007
emissions
EU region ETS non-
ETS
ETS non-
ETS
ETS non-
ETS
ETS non-
ETS
ETS non-
ETS
Austria 20 44 12 48
Jo
in
t
ta
rg
et
39
Jo
in
t
ta
rg
et
9
Baltic States 21 22 16 23 19 4
Belgium 34 72 52 78 63 15
Czech Rep. 76 34 84 43 30 13
Denmark 25 47 17 51 41 10
Finland 36 26 25 27 23 4
France 91 299 59 303 261 42
Germany 390 357 371 366 311 55
Greece 56 155 66 186 135 51 ↑ ↑
Hungary 23 28 14 29 25 4
Ireland 18 34 9 34 29 5 0.73 0.87
Italy 189 250 156 230 218 12
Netherlands 67 104 61 118 91 27 ↓ ↓
Norway 7 60 5 59 52 7
Poland 188 103 243 121 90 31
Portugal 26 35 20 34 30 4
Rest of EU 113 96 144 111 84 27
Slovakia 15 14 21 18 12 6
Spain 161 189 141 194 165 29
Sweden 12 36 10 38 31 7
UK 232 314 238 326 274 52
Total 1801 2322 1764 2437 1318 2023 446 414 0.73 0.87
Note: In order to obatin the emission targets of the ETS sector in the year 2020, we
apply the country specific allocation factors according to the National Allocation Plans for the
second phase of the EU ETS (2008-2012), whereas from 2013 to 2020 we apply a reduction
of 1.74% p.a. for each EU region as envisaged by phase 3 of the EU ETS. Regarding the
non-ETS sectors, national emission targets are given by the Effort Sharing Decision (European
Commission, 2009), implying a reduction of 1.95% p.a. from 2013 to 2020 for each EU member
country.
Given the estimates of parameters and the abatement targets from Table 4.1,
we are now able to solve the partial equilibrium model for the benchmark
situation with a fixed joint target for the ETS sector and individual national
targets for the non-ETS sector. That is, we minimize abatement costs in the
ETS sector across all countries subject to the joint EU ETS target denoted by Z,
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whereas the individual targets for the non-ETS sector are assumed to be met by
national carbon taxes, i.e.
qi(yi) +minxi ∑i
ci(xi)
s.t. ∑
i
xi = Z.
(4.10)
The resulting benchmark EUA price ρo in the year 2020 is around 23e per ton.
The price is well in line with predictions of other energy-economy models for
the year 2020 (cf. Knopf et al., 2013, p.22), though significantly higher than
the actual EUA price of around 5e per ton in recent years (2013-2018). For
the discussion of possible reasons for the deviation between the actual price
and predictions of energy-economy models, we refer to Edenhofer et al. (2014,
p.14f.). National non-ETS benchmark prices pioi range from 25e per ton in Italy
up to 105e per ton in the Netherlands (see second column of Table 4.2). The
total abatement costs of the partitioned EU carbon market in the second best
solution (4.10) are 17bne in the year 2020, of which 4.5bne and 12.5bne are
abatement costs in the ETS and non-ETS sector, respectively. In the first best
solution, in which all countries and sectors are included in the ETS, the efficient
price is 37e per ton. The total abatement costs in the first best solution are
13.6bne and thus 25% lower than in the second best solution. This is within
the range of results in e.g. Böhringer et al. (2008).
We now turn to the policy options from Section 4.3 and introduce a national
carbon price floor in each of the 21 EU regions, but only in one country at
a time. Figure 4.6 shows that the climate levy is a highly costly policy option
with rather limited environmental effects. The top figure shows the national
emissions reduction for the six largest EU emitters. We find that Poland and
Germany show the highest potential to reduce national emissions. However,
this policy option comes at significant costs for the country introducing the
price floor as shown in the bottom graph of Figure 4.6. For instance, a price
floor of 30e per ton in Germany’s ETS sector leads to an emissions reduction
of only 2.9% (17 Mt) in 2020, but to a cost increase of 18% (447mne).
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Figure 4.6: National emissions reduction and cost increase of the climate levy
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In contrast, in our two alternative policy options we suggest that policy-
makers follow an optimization behavior. The results for the policy option cost
optimization are shown in Table 4.2. The first two columns show the benchmark
prices of the ETS and non-ETS sector in the second best solution. The optimal
national price floor levels ρκ are shown in the third column. They range from
24e per ton in Italy to 79e per ton in Sweden. National cost reductions of the
optimal price floors can be significant and savings are as high as 15-30% in
almost half of the countries. In only one third of the countries the savings are
less than 10%. Besides the country aggregation ‘Rest of the EU’, we find that
Finland, Slovakia, and Belgium show the highest potential to reduce national
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abatement costs. By introducing a price floor of 38.3e, 40.9e and 52.9e per
ton, these countries are able to reduce costs by 32.5% (95mne), 24% (61mne),
and 23.5% (162mne), respectively. The policy leads to a significant shift in
abatement costs between the ETS and non-ETS sector. In almost half of the
countries, the costs in the ETS sector double, triple or even quadruple while
the costs in the non-ETS sector only halve in most of the countries. From an
EU-wide perspective, Germany shows the highest potential to reduce inefficien-
cies of the overall EU carbon market since it is the largest emitter. A national
price floor of around 32e per ton in Germany would lead to an EU-wide cost
reduction of around 2.2% (370mne) in 2020.
Table 4.2: Policy simulation results under national cost optimization
ETS
bench-
mark
price in e
per ton of
CO2 (ρ0)
Non-ETS
bench-
mark
price in e
per ton of
CO2 (pi0i )
Optimal
national
carbon
price floor
in e per
ton of
CO2 (ρκ)
National
cost
reduction
in %
National
cost
change in
ETS
sector in
%
National
cost
change in
non-ETS
sector in
%
EU-wide
cost
reduction
in %
Austria 23.3 81.1 58.0 17.6 328.4 -43.5 0.41
Baltic states 23.3 52.8 34.4 11.4 33.5 -52.2 0.10
Belgium 23.3 86.2 52.9 23.5 253.7 -57.3 0.95
Czech Rep. 23.3 86.3 33.0 22.2 41.5 -77.0 1.02
Denmark 23.3 98.8 68.2 20.9 275.0 -47.3 0.67
Finland 23.3 97.9 38.3 32.5 104.9 -82.4 0.56
France 23.3 56.6 49.2 6.8 145.6 -21.6 0.51
Germany 23.3 57.2 32.4 14.6 54.9 -63.0 2.17
Greece 23.3 49.7 39.9 7.7 75.3 -29.8 0.63
Hungary 23.3 42.0 33.0 6.1 94.9 -32.6 0.04
Ireland 23.3 47.4 40.5 6.1 43.3 -23.9 0.05
Italy 23.3 25.0 24.1 0.1 16.4 -7.2 0.00
Netherlands 23.3 104.5 75.9 19.4 407.4 -41.7 1.59
Norway 23.3 59.2 55.0 4.1 79.1 -12.2 0.05
Poland 23.3 45.6 27.3 6.5 22.2 -51.4 0.50
Portugal 23.3 54.8 37.4 12.4 75.1 -51.1 0.12
Rest of EU 23.3 90.6 38.7 29.0 105.1 -76.3 2.59
Slovakia 23.3 85.5 40.9 24.0 135.2 -65.3 0.36
Spain 23.3 65.2 40.6 17.0 69.3 -57.1 1.30
Sweden 23.3 104.2 78.5 19.0 278.3 -39.6 0.40
UK 23.3 52.0 36.1 10.9 92.0 -45.5 1.15
Note: The table shows national results for the case that only one of the respective EU regions introduces a
national carbon price floor in 2020.
The results for the policy option environmental optimization are shown in
Table 4.3. The first two columns show the benchmark abatement quantities in
the ETS and non-ETS sector in the second best solution. The optimal national
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price floor levels ρu are again shown in the third column. Similarly to the
previous policy, they range from 24e per ton in Italy to 90e per ton in Sweden.
Compared to the cost reductions of the previous policy, the national emissions
reduction of the optimal price floors are less significant and savings are only
as high as 1-6%. We find that the Czech Republic, Finland and Slovakia show
the highest potential to reduce national emissions without any additional costs.
By introducing a price floor of 41e, 50e and 50e per ton, these countries are
able to reduce emissions by 5.8% (4.7 Mt), 5.5% (2.2 Mt), and 5.1% (1.3 Mt),
respectively. In one third of the EU regions the emissions reduction is only
around 1% or less. Therefore, the shift of emissions between the sectors is less
significant than the shift of abatement costs in the previous policy. In more
than one third of the countries, the emissions savings in the ETS sector are
as high as 20-30% while the emissions in the non-ETS sector only increase by
around 5-10%. From an EU-wide perspective, again Germany shows the highest
potential to reduce inefficiencies of the overall EU carbon market. A national
price floor of around 36e per ton in Germany would lead to an EU-wide
emissions reduction of around 0.3% (10.8 Mt).
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Table 4.3: Policy simulation results under national environmental optimization
ETS
bench-
mark
abate-
ment in
Mt of
CO2 (x˜0i )
Non-ETS
bench-
mark
emissions
in Mt of
CO2 (y0i )
Optimal
national
carbon
price floor
in e per
ton of
CO2 (ρu)
National
emissions
reduction
in %
National
emissions
change in
ETS
sector in
%
National
emissions
change in
non-ETS
sector in
%
EU-wide
emissions
reduction
in %
Austria 2.6 9.5 65.3 2.3 -27.0 3.9 0.03
Baltic states 6.8 3.8 37.5 1.7 -14.9 5.1 0.01
Belgium 8.9 14.9 62.3 2.7 -14.9 5.6 0.08
Czech Rep. 32.7 13.0 40.9 5.8 -18.5 16.0 0.14
Denmark 5.5 10.4 79.6 3.0 -29.0 4.2 0.05
Finland 9.0 4.4 50.2 5.5 -25.5 8.9 0.06
France 10.5 42.4 51.3 0.6 -10.5 1.3 0.05
Germany 96.5 54.4 36.0 1.8 -10.8 6.0 0.32
Greece 22.0 50.9 42.1 1.4 -19.0 4.3 0.08
Hungary 2.8 4.2 34.3 0.6 -7.1 2.5 0.01
Ireland 2.2 5.0 42.1 0.5 -9.9 1.7 0.01
Italy 26.0 11.6 24.1 0.0 -0.4 0.2 0.00
Netherlands 8.0 26.9 87.2 2.3 -13.0 3.9 0.10
Norway 0.8 6.8 56.4 0.3 -9.9 0.5 0.00
Poland 68.0 30.6 28.6 1.2 -6.0 8.2 0.09
Portugal 5.9 4.0 41.0 1.2 -11.1 3.4 0.02
Rest of EU 37.4 27.5 49.5 5.3 -18.9 12.2 0.30
Slovakia 6.8 5.8 50.2 5.1 -20.7 12.3 0.04
Spain 43.8 29.3 46.3 1.9 -13.3 4.8 0.15
Sweden 1.8 6.7 89.8 2.0 -19.9 2.6 0.02
UK 47.8 52.2 39.0 1.1 -8.4 4.0 0.16
Note: The table shows national results for the case that only one of the respective EU regions introduces a
national carbon price floor in 2020.
4.4.3 Discussion
Our policy simulations for the EU carbon market show that there are possibili-
ties for effective and cost-efficient additional national climate policy efforts. The
introduction of a climate levy is in principle already possible, especially since the
establishment of the MSR that allows for retiring allowances. However, instead
of imposing the levy only on certain power stations as intended by the German
proposal from 2015, we suggest to introduce a true national carbon price floor
for all emitters in the ETS. Nevertheless, our empirical results show that such
a policy option, in which allowances are only retired but not shifted between
sectors, is very expensive and has only limited effects on national emissions
reduction.
124 national climate policy under the eu emissions trading system
Compared to the climate levy, our two alternative policy options, in which
emission targets are fully or partially shifted from the ETS to non-ETS sectors,
are not yet possible in practice since the non-ETS targets are fixed in the EU
Effort Sharing Decision (European Commission, 2009). However, we argue
that such an option is advisable. In fact, the more recent plan of the German
government to buy additional EUAs from other member states in order to
compensate for missing its non-ETS target goes in a similar direction (Tutt,
2018). Moreover, since our two policies do not interfere with all EU targets but
only increase the options for more ambitious countries, it may be easier to agree
on compared to other reforms. Further, if it would be possible for a country to
reduce national costs or emissions according to our suggestions, other countries
might follow which could create a momentum for introducing an EU-wide
price floor in the ETS sector as suggested by e.g. Edenhofer and Schmidt (2018).
In order to put our simulation results into context, we compare our estimates
of the optimal national price floor levels from Section 4.4.2 with price floors that
have been discussed in certain EU countries, even though they do not include
any retirement of allowances and shifting of targets. Thus, they do not imply
any emissions reduction and further increase EU-wide inefficiencies as shown
by Böhringer et al. (2008) and Heindl et al. (2014). A price floor as for instance
announced in France (The Guardian, 2016) will simply increase national and
EU-wide costs without being effective because the additional abatement is offset
by EU ETS sectors outside France not facing the price floor.
We find that the announced French price floor of 30e per ton would lead to
additional cost of 43mne in the year 2020, which corresponds to an increase
of national and EU-wide abatement costs by 3.3% and 0.25%, respectively.
According to our policy simulations, France shows generally little potential to
reduce national abatement costs or emissions. The optimal price floor levels
of 49e per ton under cost optimization and 51e per ton under environmental
optimization lead to national cost and emission reductions of 6.8% (87mne) and
0.6% (1.7 Mt) in 2020, respectively.
In addition to introducing a national price floor, France tried to convince
Germany of jointly establishing a price floor in the ETS sector in order to create
a momentum for other European countries (De Beaupuy and Amiel, 2016).
Similar to the cost effects of the climate levy, such a simple price floor of 30e
per ton in Germany would lead to additional cost of 447mne in 2020. However,
in contrast to the climate levy, the price floor has no effect on the EU-wide
emission level. The additional cost of 447mne correspond to a national and
EU-wide cost increase of around 18% and 2.6%, respectively. Nevertheless, if
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allowing for shifting emission targets, the idea is promising since Germany
shows the highest potential for reducing EU-wide inefficiencies of the carbon
market. Besides, a price floor of 30e per ton comes close to our estimates of
the optimal level.
Finally, we may compare our results with the UK price floor of 25e per ton,
which was introduced in 2013 when the actual EUA price was only around
5e per ton. Thus, at that time, the UK price floor corresponded to a tax of
around 20e per ton on top of the EUA price. In our simulations for the year
2020, the benchmark EUA price is 23e per ton and thus much higher than
the actual price of 5e per ton between 2013 and 2018. Therefore, as a rough
approximation, we estimate the additional cost of the UK price floor by the
introduction of a price floor of 43e per ton in our setting. We find that the
additional cost amount to 593mne in 2020, which corresponds to a national
and EU-wide cost increase of 33% and 3.5%, respectively. Yet again, the UK
price floor does not reduce the EU-wide emission level. Regarding our two
alternative policy options, we estimate optimal price floor levels for the UK
of 36e per ton under cost optimization and 39e per ton under environmental
optimization. These would lead to a national cost reduction of 11% (195mne)
and emissions reduction of 1.1% (5.2 Mt).
All in all, we find that both our policy options are very promising from a
national perspective. However, under cost optimization policymakers have to be
aware that the price floor leads to a significant shift of costs between ETS and
non-ETS sectors. Under environmental optimization, the potential for national
emissions reduction at basically no extra cost is rather limited. According to
our analysis, the German climate levy proposal would have been a highly costly
policy option while its cost efficiency results can hardly be determined since
both costs and benefits change.
In any case, our empirical results have to be taken with care since our policy
options are very stylized. In practice, it would be very hard to monitor how
much emissions may be shifted from the ETS to non-ETS sector or retired due to
the price floor. Policymakers would need to have reliable estimates of abatement
costs for specific sectors or firms. Further, there exist huge sectoral differences
in abatement costs within the ETS and non-ETS sectors (recall Figure 4.7,
Appendix A.1). Therefore, potential cost or emission reductions very much
depend on whether coal-fired power plants in the electricity sector or rubber
production plants in the chemical sector face the price floor. Policymakers might
increase emission targets in ETS sectors that face high marginal abatement costs
but relax targets in non-ETS sectors that face low marginal abatement costs
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which may even result in efficiency losses. That is, our assumption that it is
usually more expensive to abate emissions in non-ETS sectors ignores the large
innovation potential with regard to abatement technologies in sectors such as
transport and housing.
Yet, a pragmatic approach may be to implement a price floor in the order
of 30e per ton, which roughly is a lower bound in our estimates, in order to
use the revenue to buy EUAs and retire them. Then, abatement efforts in the
non-ETS sectors can be reduced by the same amount (cost optimization) or a
smaller amount (environmental optimization). In most countries where there is
strong evidence that more abatement should take place within the ETS and
less outside, these policies are likely to decrease overall costs or to achieve
additional emissions reduction at basically no extra costs.
4.5 conclusion
In this paper, we explored the potential scope and optimal design of national
climate policy in the current EU policy framework. The question is whether
certain carbon pricing policies in the national EU ETS sectors, although in-
terfering with the EU ETS, can reduce emissions (and thus be effective) and
abatement costs (and thus be cost-efficient). While additional national climate
policy efforts analyzed in previous papers are always found to be inefficient,
we find that this does not need to be the case if policies are designed in such a
way that they allow for retiring emission allowances as well as shifting emission
targets from the ETS to non-ETS sectors.
Therefore, we discuss three carbon pricing policy options. First, a carbon
price floor that simply allows for retiring emission allowances as stipulated by
the Germany climate levy proposal from 2015. Secondly, a carbon price floor
in which national policymakers follow a cost optimization behavior by fully
shifting additional reduction targets from the ETS to non-ETS sectors as well
as retiring emission allowances. Thirdly, a carbon price floor in which national
policymakers follow an environmental optimization behavior by partially shifting
additional reduction targets from the ETS to non-ETS sectors as well as retiring
emission allowances. The latter two options allow for either achieving the
same emission target as before at lower abatement costs or achieving a higher
emission target at the same abatement costs as before.
In a simple theoretical framework with one country and two sectors, we argue
that introducing a climate levy in the national ETS sector is likely to be a highly
costly policy option while its cost efficiency results are very unclear. Therefore,
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we rather suggest to follow an optimization behavior when introducing a
carbon price floor. We show that this is possible by shifting emission targets
between sectors in order to hedge against the differences in marginal abatement
costs across sectors. In this regard, we derive the optimality conditions for
the carbon price floor level under cost and environmental optimization behavior,
respectively. Moreover, we are able to derive a closed form solution for the
optimal price floor level for both these policy options. According to that, the
optimal price floor level is a weighted average of the old carbon prices in the
ETS and non-ETS sector before the introduction of the policy.
In order to determine the empirical relevance for the EU, we conduct a
numerical partial equilibrium analysis of the EU carbon market in 2020. The
current inefficiency in the already second best benchmark situation with two
carbon markets, one with emissions trading and one without, leads to additional
costs of around 3.4bne. Thus, total abatement costs are 25% higher compared
to a market with all sectors included in the EU ETS.
We find that the climate levy is a highly costly policy option with rather limited
environmental effects. For instance, the introduction of a price floor of 30e
per ton in Germany’s ETS sector leads to an emissions reduction of only 2.9%
(17 Mt) in 2020, but to a cost increase of 18% (447mne). In contrast, our two
alternative policy suggestions are very promising from a national perspective
without interfering with the EU ETS. Under cost optimization, the optimal price
floor levels range from 24e per ton in Italy to 79e per ton in Sweden. The
resulting national cost reductions can be significant and savings are as high as
15-30% in almost half of the EU countries. For instance, the introduction of a
price floor of 32e per ton in Germany would lead to cost savings of 370mne in
2020, corresponding to a national and EU-wide cost decrease of 14.6% and 2.2%,
respectively. Under environmental optimization, the optimal price floor levels
are very similar to the previous policy, but slightly higher because a lower
emission target is reached. Compared to the cost savings under cost optimization,
the national emission reductions of the optimal carbon price floors are less
significant and emissions savings are only as high as 1-6%. However, these
savings come at basically no extra costs. For instance, the introduction of a price
floor of 36e per ton in Germany would lead to emission savings of around
11 Mt in 2020 without any addition costs, corresponding to a national and
EU-wide emissions reduction of 1.8% and 0.3%, respectively.
Despite the stylized nature of the three policies discussed in the course
of this paper, we conclude that national climate policy efforts can indeed be
effective and cost-efficient in the current EU policy setting. The retirement of
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emission allowances is in principle already possible since the establishment of
the MSR. The shift of abatement efforts from the non-ETS to ETS sectors is not
possible within the current framework, but we argue that such an option is very
attractive from a national perspective.
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a.1 Sectoral marginal abatement cost curves
Figure 4.7: OLS fit of non-linear sectoral marginal abatement cost curves in selected
ETS and non-ETS sectors of Germany, France and the UK
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
20
40
60
80
100
Abatement relative to business-as-usual emissions (in %)
Pr
ic
e
in
e
pe
r
to
n
of
C
O
2
ETS
ely
eis
oil
crp
(a) Germany
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
20
40
60
80
100
Abatement relative to business-as-usual emissions (in %)
Pr
ic
e
in
e
pe
r
to
n
of
C
O
2
non-ETS
oli
col
svcsmob
(b) Germany
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(c) France
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(d) France
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(f) UK
Note: oil, refined oil products; crp, chemical and rubber products; eis, energy intensive sectors; ely, electricity; mob,
mobility; svcs, services; ohi, other heavy industries; oli, other light industries; col, coal; cru, crude oil production.
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